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Abstract 
 
Since the democratic transition in the early nineties, successive Hungarian governments have 
sought to engage and support the Hungarian diaspora outside the borders of the state. This 
commitment to creating a diaspora community tied to an imagined motherland can be 
conceptualised as diaspora politics. Whilst diaspora politics should be differentiated from what 
is often referred to as nationalist politics, they are always concerned with the place of the 
diaspora in relation to the nation. In that regard, it can be said that diaspora politics – and the 
actors taking part in them – play a role in processes of nation-production, insofar as they 
contribute to the conservation or modifications of the principles of visions and divisions of the 
national world. 
 Although diaspora politics have been an important feature of Hungarian politics for 
almost thirty years, the establishment of a Fidesz-KDNP government in 2010 constitutes a key 
moment in the development of Hungarian diaspora politics. The new government seized the 
pre-existing diaspora political institutions and developed a wide range of new laws, 
programmes, and institutions representing the Hungarian diaspora as embedded into the wider 
Hungarian nation. 
 Drawing upon Pierre Bourdieu’s key political concepts, this thesis inquires how 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 have contributed to the production and 
reproduction of Hungarian national di/visions. Through an analysis of major laws, documents, 
institutions, programmes, and publications related to Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 
and 2019, it is argued that the development of a new legal and institutional framework for 
Hungarian diaspora politics since 2010 has provided the means to produce, reproduce, and 
legitimate the integration and dissolution of the diaspora in a redefined Hungarian nation. 
Furthermore, taking as a case study the journal Minority Studies edited by the Research Institute 
for Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI) between 2013 and 2016, this thesis contends that 
this diaspora integration has taken place through the redefinition of the boundaries of the 
national world. Specifically, the production of a renewed Hungarian nation has been permitted 
by the representations of historical, cultural, and political principles of national di/visions. 
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Introduction 
Between 6th December 2019 and 15th March 2020, the Hungarian National Museum is home 
to an exhibition called ‘Magyar Világ 1938-1940’. The exhibition opens with a lengthy 
description of the consequences of the First World War for the Kingdom of Hungary, namely 
the loss of part of its territory and population under the Peace Treaty of Trianon in 1920. The 
exposition however focuses on the period of time between 1938 and 1940, just before Hungary 
entered the Second World War. This period corresponds to a moment where the country, 
through political alliance with the Axis powers (First and Second Vienna Awards), regained 
parts of the territory lost after Trianon. The exhibition celebrates this period of ‘békés területi 
[revíziók] … Ez a korszak a kávézók, a magyar filmek aranykora, amikor a Szent István-
emlékév és az Eucharisztikus Világkongresszus alatt a magyarság bebizonyította, hogy 
ragaszkodik keresztény gyökereihez, míg magyarok milliói tértek vissza az anyaországhoz’ 
(‘peaceful territorial revisions ... the golden age of cafes, Hungarian films, when during the St 
Stephen's Memorial Year and the Eucharistic World Congress, Hungarians proved their 
attachment to their Christian roots while millions of Hungarians returned to their homeland’) 
(‘Történelmi háttér (Historical Background)’ n.d.). 
The political character of the ‘Magyar Világ 1938-1940’ exhibition is undeniable. In 
2020, the Hungarian state will mark the centenary of the Treaty of Trianon, and the Fidesz-
KDNP 1   government established since 2010 seems determined to take the occasion to 
politically capitalise on the representation of a nation divided by the turmoil of the 20th 
century.2 In fact, the exhibition is partly financed by the Bethlen Gábor Fund, an institution 
created in 2011 with the aim of supporting and preserving Hungarian culture outside the 
borders of Hungary. 
 The Bethlen Gábor Fund was created in 2011, following the establishment of a new 
Fidesz-KDNP government at the head of Hungary in 2010. After eight years of socialist-led 
government, the 2010 Parliamentary elections saw the landslide victory of Fidesz-KDNP, 
 
1. The Fidesz-KDNP alliance is a political coalition between two Hungarian parties, the 
Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance (Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség) and the Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) that have been running together in Hungarian national 
elections since 2006. Whilst some claim that KDNP may be ‘perhaps best described as a 
satellite party’ of Fidesz (Batory 2010b: 3), I will keep referring to Fidesz-KDNP throughout 
this thesis, because KDNP’s leader Zsolt Semjén arguably plays a leading role in Hungarian 
diaspora politics. 
 
2. See for instance Vass (2019). 
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which obtained about 52% of the votes, allowing the coalition to secure an absolute majority 
in the Parliament, while Viktor Orbán formed his second government.3 Fidesz-KDNP has since 
confirmed its domination of the Hungarian political stage, winning again the 2014 and 2018 
Parliamentary elections, with respectively 44% and 49% of the votes (‘Electing Members of 
the National Assembly’ 2019). 
 Several arguments have been advanced to explain this overwhelming 2010 victory 
against the socialist MSzP party, which had been in power since 2002. Most notably, 
commentators held the 2006 ‘Őszöd speech’ as crucial in this defeat (see for example Batory 
2010b). A discourse during a party congress, wherein Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány openly 
recognised that the MSzP government had lied to the Hungarian population, leaked and was 
broadcast on public radio, leading to mass protests and popular discontent. Whilst this scandal, 
coupled with the unpopular austerity measures taken by the government in 2009, contributed 
to sealing the fate of the Hungarian socialist party (Batory 2010b), Fidesz-KDNP also seduced 
its electorate by using specific campaign themes, which, if they were not necessarily absent 
from the other parties' rhetoric, have become its trademark. Namely, Fidesz-KDNP capitalised 
on the question of the Hungarian diaspora abroad and made the határon túli magyarok 
(Hungarians beyond the borders) an important theme of its electoral campaign, leading the 
coalition to be elected at the head of the Hungarian state (Waterbury 2006a). 
 The commitment to supporting a diaspora community tied to a putative motherland can 
be conceptualised as diaspora politics. Whilst diaspora politics have been an important feature 
of Hungarian politics for almost thirty years, the establishment of a Fidesz-KDNP government 
constitutes a key moment in the development of Hungarian diaspora politics. The new 
government seized the pre-existing diaspora political institutions in Hungary, and developed a 
wide range of new laws, programmes and institutions in order to integrate the diaspora into the 
‘Hungarian nation’. For instance, a new constitution adopted in 2011 proclaims the unity of the 
Hungarian nation, and the responsibility of the Hungarian state for the survival and 
development of the Hungarian diaspora (The Fundamental Law of Hungary 2011). Virtually at 
the same time, preferential naturalisation was offered to members of the diaspora in 
neighbouring states (Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship 2012) and the new non-resident 
Hungarian citizens were allowed to vote in Hungarian Parliamentary elections (Act CCII of 
2011 on the Election of Members of the National Assembly 2012). 
 
3. Viktor Orbán had already been Prime minister between 1998 and 2002. 
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Thereby, the link between state, nation and political community was challenged: from 
then on, the Hungarian political community would be constituted from the members of an 
extended Hungarian nation (culturally defined), within and without the Hungarian state. Along 
with these legislative reforms, numerous institutions were created with the aim of strengthening 
and supporting relations between the Hungarian state and the diaspora. 
 Actors involved in diaspora politics produce and reproduce images and representations 
of the Hungarian diaspora. As an example, the new constitution mentioned above represents 
the Hungarian diaspora as included in the definition of the Hungarian nation. Moreover, the 
pictures circulating of the Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT) meetings display a 
symbolic vision of the Hungarian nation constituted by Hungarian diaspora representatives and 
the Hungarian government, while publications released by NPKI pinpoint the challenges faced 
by the Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin. 
 Whilst diaspora politics are distinct from what it often referred to as nationalist politics, 
they always discuss the place of the diaspora in relation to the nation. In that regard, it can be 
said that diaspora politics – and the actors taking part in them – play a role in processes of 
nation-production, insofar as they contribute to the conservation or modification of the 
principles of visions and divisions of the ‘national world’. The representations produced by 
diaspora politics actors may in turn affect social practices, and particularly national practices. 
Therefore, diaspora politics deserve attention in order to study the conditions of production of 
the most political community: the nation. 
In the Hungarian case, the diaspora seems increasingly integrated in representations of 
the Hungarian nation since 2010. As the establishment of a new government in 2010 has opened 
the way to the development of new Hungarian diaspora political actors and institutions, this 
research will seek to determine how Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 have 
contributed to the production and reproduction of Hungarian national di/visions. 
Based on the analysis of laws, documents, institutions, programmes and publications 
falling within the scope of Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019, I will first 
argue that the accession of Fidesz-KDNP at the head of the Hungarian state allowed the party 
to access the legal and institutional means to produce, reproduce and legitimate the unification 
of the diaspora within the Hungarian nation. 
Moreover, I will content that this unification is produced through three key principles 
of division of the national world: historical, political, and ethno-cultural, based on the case 
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study of Minority Studies, a social-scientific journal published by the Research Institute for 
Hungarian Communities Abroad between 2013 and 2016.  
Whilst my analysis of Hungarian diaspora politics is empirically informed, the starting 
point of this research is theoretical. Namely, the broader aim of this thesis is to inquire how a 
Bourdieusian framework can contribute to the analysis of diaspora politics – what it is, what it 
does, who does it, to what end. In that regard, this research falls within the scope of a possible 
‘Bourdieusian school’ in the field of nationalism studies. 
Since the nineties, several authors have sought to bring Pierre Bourdieu’s work into the 
study of nationalism, and embraced the analysis of nation and nationalism through key 
concepts such as field, struggle, principles of di/vision, etc. Among these scholars, studies by 
Rogers Brubaker (1996; 2000; 2002; 2005),4 Philip S. Gorski (2013), Marc Helbling (2007) 
have shown the way towards defining the nation as historically-produced principles of vision 
and division of the social world. This research aims to take part in this theoretical discussion 
on ‘nation-re/production’ with a focus on diaspora politics as actor of this re/production and 
can be considered to a large extent exploratory. 
Moreover, I aim to contribute to the literature on diaspora politics in Central and Eastern 
Europe and beyond. In the literature, diaspora politics have often been scrutinised as a result 
of the collapse of the communist regimes and the ensuing processes of ‘re-nationalisation’ of 
the states in the former Eastern bloc. However, the literature on diaspora politics primarily 
developed with regard to the traditional Jewish diaspora, and thereafter diasporas produced by 
increasing migration movements, particularly in the West (Brubaker 2005). With the Hungarian 
case, I hope to provide reflections on the role of diaspora politics in constructing the nation, 
that I wish to be useful to analysing the place of imagined diasporas in the production of nations 
elsewhere in the world. 
This thesis is divided in four chapters. Chapter 1 provides the theoretical backbone of 
this thesis. Namely, it presents a literature review on the key concept of diaspora politics, 
underlining the definition used throughout this thesis, the disciplinary interpretations that have 
previously been made of Hungarian diaspora politics, as well as the significance of the 
phenomenon. Additionally, Chapter 1 explores how Pierre Bourdieu’s elements of political 
theory can provide a relevant conceptual framework to analyse the role of diaspora politics in 
the re/production of nations. I will introduce the concept of diaspora political field, define the 
 
4. See also Brubaker’s early works on Bourdieu and social theory (1985; 1993). 
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relation between diaspora politics and the production of the national world, and suggest the 
analysis of diaspora politics as struggles for and of representations. 
Chapter 2 presents the methodology used to elaborate the argument of this thesis. It 
outlines the methodology mobilised for Chapter 3 and for Chapter 4, as well as the specific 
research questions respectively addressed in these chapters. Namely, the arguments in this 
thesis were elaborated through the content analysis of laws, documents, institutions, 
programmes and publications related to Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019, 
with a focus on the journal Minority Studies (2013-2016) in Chapter 4. The second chapter also 
gives an overview of the definition and collection of the research data, and finally discusses 
the limits of the research methodology used in this thesis. 
Chapter 3 inquires how the development of a legal and institutional framework to 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 has enabled the production and 
reproduction of new national representations. I will first present the constitution of a Hungarian 
diaspora political field following the democratic transition of Hungary in the early nineties. 
Then, based on a review of the major laws, documents, institutions, programmes and media 
that have constituted Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019, I will demonstrate 
how the accession to power of Fidesz-KDNP in 2010 triggered a restructuring the field, 
whereby a new legal framework came to legitimate the dissolution of the diaspora in the 
Hungarian nation, and a new institutional framework permitted the production and 
reproduction of new national representations. 
Finally, Chapter 4 looks at how visions and divisions of the national world are 
represented and legitimated by actors engaged in the diaspora political field. In order to answer 
this question, I will undertake a case study on Minority Studies, a journal edited by NPKI, a 
key institution in Hungarian diaspora politics since 2011. I will successively present the key 
principles of di/vision of the national world developed in Minority Studies, namely historical, 
cultural and political principles, that I will illustrate with regular quotes from the journal. 
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Chapter 1. A Bourdieusian Approach to Diaspora Politics 
In this first chapter, I will inquire how Pierre Bourdieu’s elements of political theory can 
provide a relevant conceptual framework to analyse the role of diaspora politics in the 
production of the nation. I will show that the concepts of ‘political field’, ‘principles of vision 
and division’, and ‘political representation’ provide the opportunity to re-define the nature of 
diaspora politics as a representation struggle, taking place in the diaspora political field, for the 
imposition of principles of vision and division of the national world.  
In the first part, I will undertake a review of the literature on Hungarian diaspora politics 
and develop a definition of the concept. I will then present disciplinary approaches in the study 
of diaspora politics. I will also expound upon the significance of diaspora politics at different 
levels. Particularly, I will highlight the influence of diaspora politics on social representations 
and group boundary-making, in order to situate the scope of this thesis. In the second part of 
this chapter, I will argue that Pierre Bourdieu’s writings on politics can bring relevant concepts 
and perspectives in the study of diaspora politics. Namely, I will develop the concept of 
diaspora political field, underline the role of diaspora politics in the production of national 
visions and divisions, and suggest a redefinition of the nature of diaspora politics as struggle 
for and of national representations. 
 
1.1 Concept, Interpretations, and Significance of Diaspora Politics 
Conceptualising Diaspora Politics 
Following the end of the Cold War, several states of the post-socialist area developed policies 
aimed at creating ties with populations living outside their borders. Specifically, the 
restructuring of the political field, as well as the redrawing of political borders that left 
‘stranded diasporas’ (King and Melvin 1999) in several places across the post-socialist world, 
led the newly established governments to develop an interest in fostering relations with citizens 
of neighbour states, on the basis of cultural or linguistic affinities. The commitment to creating 
a diaspora community tied to an imagined motherland can be conceptualised as diaspora 
politics. It has attracted a lot of scholarly attention in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Eurasia, but also in other parts of the world, as the result of increasing migration. Diaspora 
politics can take different forms, such as laws, policy documents, institutions, media, 
programmes or political decisions, united by their common purpose: integrating populations 
outside the border of the state into the national community. 
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In Hungary, the government engaged very early in a form of diaspora politics 
(nemzetpolitika), that relies on representations of the Hungarian nation as divided by the 
historical turmoil of the 20th century, particularly following the First World War. Accordingly, 
the Hungarian government ought to demonstrate a sense of responsibility towards a Hungarian 
diaspora abroad. Perhaps because of the sizeable number of citizens that identify as (ethnic) 
Hungarians in Hungary's neighbouring states, and of the fear of irredentism that it may generate, 
the Hungarian case has received much attention in academic literature. 
 Diaspora policies in Hungary and beyond have in common that they refer to a diaspora 
population outside the state. However, the understanding of what is the diaspora—how many 
members, where it lives, whether there is one or several diasporas, or even whether it exists— 
is precisely subject to political debate. In the Hungarian case, governments are usually targeting 
populations identifying as ethnic Hungarian in the countries surrounding Hungary, particularly 
in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, and to a lesser extent Croatia, Slovenia, and Austria. In 
Hungarian, the expression határon túli magyarok (Hungarians beyond the borders) is 
commonly used to refer to this diaspora population in the Carpathian Basin. However, in recent 
years, the government also developed policies targeting the (descendants of) Hungarian 
migrants in the West, particularly in the United States, Canada, Western Europe, and Latin 
America, this time evoked as diaszpóra in Hungarian. 
The academic literature is not consistent in the way the Hungarian diaspora is 
conceptualised. Depending on the author, it may be referred to as a transborder community 
(Sabanadze 2006), transborder kin (Csergő and Goldgeier 2004), a transborder ethnic group 
(Waterbury 2009), transborder ethnic-kin minorities (M. Kovács 2006), or transborder co-
ethnic (Pap 2013). A large collection of articles also uses the term national minority or minority, 
traditionally linked to the concept of minority rights, and widely use in law (Skovgaard 2007; 
Vizi 2005). As Kántor et al. (2004) remark, a kin-minority variation gained momentum at the 
turn of the millennium, when the Venice Commission decided to use the term kin-state to refer 
to Hungary, and kin-minorities to refer to the diaspora in the midst of the so-called Status Law 
controversy: ‘Kin-States ... have shown their wish to intervene more significantly, and directly, 
i.e. parallel to the fora provided in the framework of international co-operation in this field, in 
favour of their kin-minorities’ (‘Report on the Preferential Treatment of National Minorities by 
Their Kin-State, Adopted by the Venice Commission at Its 48th Plenary Meeting (Venice, 19-
20 October 2001)’ 2001. Emphasis in the original).   
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However, the concepts of diaspora, and the ensuing diaspora politics are particularly 
valuable to analyse transstate forms of political engagement such as the Hungarian case. In 
social sciences, the term diaspora has traditionally been mobilised to refer to the Jewish 
diaspora and became a key concept in the study of the relations between states and their out-
migrant populations over the last thirty years (Brubaker 2005). Thus, it has been rather 
mobilised in transnationalism and migration studies, and it is not widespread to describe 
Central and Eastern European realities. King and Melvin used it to describe such phenomena 
with regard to the post-Soviet space, in a sense quite similar to that of kin-state politics, while 
bringing ‘the semantic malleability of the label “diaspora”’ into the picture (King and Melvin 
1999, 113). Other authors followed their example and incorporated the term diaspora in their 
studies on Hungary, but it remains an underused term. In a way, the classical divide between 
East and West is reflected in the choice of a (kin-)minority approach for post-communist 
states—in the framework of minority or nationalism studies—while the concept of diaspora 
seems reserved for analysing populations in the Western part of the world. The distinction also 
stems from a political vision of the Hungarian diaspora as a historical, long-established, and 
legitimate inhabitant of the Carpathian Basin, while migrant populations would be responsible 
for their movement, and thus would constitute an essentially different group. 
Yet, authors such as Brubaker (2005), Waterbury (2010b) and Pogonyi (2015) have 
pointed out that the ‘kin-literature’ would gain a lot by communicating more with the ‘diaspora 
literature’, and called for bridging the conceptual divide.5 Using the term diaspora enables 
scholars to go beyond the distinction between ‘Eastern’ and ‘Western’ politics, and also 
between ‘historical’ and ‘migrant’ diasporas—thereby avoiding the taking of categories of 
practices as categories of analysis (Brubaker 2002). In fact, while diasporas may be 
differentiated in political discourses, there is little reason to treat them as distinct entities in 
social sciences, deserving two sets of concepts. Diaspora politics, be it developed by 
governments in Hungary, Mexico, or Turkey, may produce similar tensions between states, are 
developed for similar reasons, take similar forms, and are channelled through similar 
institutions (Pogonyi 2011; Waterbury 2010b). Therefore, I will use throughout this thesis the 
concept of diaspora to refer to the populations living outside the borders of the Hungarian state 
when they are objects of diaspora politics. 
 
5. For an account of how the kin-state literature and the diaspora literature can fruitfully 
draw on each other, see Waterbury (2010b, 135–146). 
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Now, what political objects may be included in the broad concept of diaspora politics? 
The literature offers different typologies of diaspora politics. For instance, Francesco Ragazzi 
divides diaspora politics into five broad categories: symbolic policies, religious and cultural 
policies, social and economic policies, citizenship policies, and state and bureaucratic control. 
Within these categories, he identifies (a) Inclusion of the diaspora in the national calendar of 
celebrations; (b) Diaspora conferences; (c) Administrative unit (directorate, agency, ministry); 
(d) Religious institutions or personnel abroad; (e) Cultural centres abroad; (f) Schools abroad; 
(g) Scientific networks; (h) Investment schemes for populations abroad; (i) Welfare provisions 
for the diaspora; (j) Welfare provision for returnees; (k) Access to citizenship through ethnic or 
religious belonging; (l) Loss of citizenship through residence abroad; (m) Loss of citizenship 
if other citizenship is adopted (acceptance of dual citizenship); (n) External vote; (o) Origin 
identification document for non-citizens; (p) Lobbying officially encouraged by the state; (q) 
Policing of populations abroad is suspected; (r) Mobility restrictions for citizens who want to 
go abroad (Ragazzi 2014, 77). 
Moreover, it is possible to add other items to Ragazzi's list, namely (s) Advocacy before 
international institutions or inter-state negotiations to defend the cultural and political rights of 
the diaspora (King and Melvin 1999, 114); (t) Special forms of political representation; (u) 
Discursive inclusions into the national community (Waterbury 2009, 5 and Waterbury 2010a, 
10.); (v) Birthright travel programmes; (w) Media (TV, newspapers or internet) for the diaspora 
(Pogonyi 2015, 80). 
During my research on the Hungarian case, I identified for my part five main categories 
to analyse Hungarian diaspora politics. First, diaspora politics can materialise in laws and legal 
documents, such as the Act LXII of 2001 on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States (2001) 
or the Act No. 45 of 2010 on the Testimony for National Cohesion (2010). Second, diaspora 
politics can take the form of political declarations or strategic documents that set visions, 
intentions and objectives, such as ‘The Founding Declaration of the Hungarian Diaspora 
Council’ (2011) or the ‘Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for 
Hungarian Communities Abroad’ (2013). Third, diaspora politics are conveyed by and played 
in institutions and administrative departments created for this purpose, such as the Research 
Institute for Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI) or the State Secretariat for Hungarian 
Communities Abroad. Fourth, institutions often develop programmes in the framework of 
diaspora politics, such as the Petőfi Sándor Programme directly developed by the Hungarian 
government, or the Julianus Programme implemented by the Hungarian Diaspora Council. 
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Fifth, diaspora political representations can be circulated through media outlets and 
publications, such as Külhoni Magyarok or Minority Studies. Whilst the list I gathered here 
may not be exhaustive, it gives a good overview of the multiple forms that diaspora politics 
have taken in Hungary since the end of the communist period. 
 
Interpreting Diaspora Politics 
The literature on diaspora politics is rich in different disciplinary perspectives. As a matter of 
fact, scholars in international relations, political science, European studies, history and 
sociology have sought to analyse and make sense of diaspora politics. For my case study, I 
mostly draw on works in political science and sociology, as they provide a relevant framework 
to analyse Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019. 
 I would first like to draw attention to an easy trap in the study of diaspora politics. 
Namely, one should be wary of examining diaspora politics as the simple manifestation of 
ethnic or cultural solidarity (Waterbury 2006a, 67). In this framework, diaspora politics would 
reflect the concern of a national government for its ‘co-ethnic’ abroad. Although such an 
argument is somewhat outdated in the scholarly discussion, it deserves a short discussion as 
parts of its rationale sometimes come back here and there. 
King and Melvin (1999) early on showed that diaspora politics are not dependent on 
putative cultural ties. By comparing the diaspora politics (or the absence of politics) of Russia, 
Ukraine and Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two authors pointed to the 
significance of domestic politics, foreign policy and economic factors in the decision—or not—
to engage populations beyond the borders, and convincingly argued that ‘politics trumps 
identity’ (King and Melvin 1999). 
In the Hungarian case, the culturalist justification to diaspora politics has been upheld 
by Hungarian political actors to mobilise around their political vision, making the argument 
particularly suspicious as scientific argument. For instance, Viktor Orbán argued that defining 
a foreign policy priority on the Hungarian diaspora was perfectly legitimate and natural, 
because it is based on national feelings and brotherhood (Waterbury 2006b, 495). In any case, 
empirical data tend to gainsay a culturalist argument for the Hungarian case. Most notably, the 
2004 referendum, where voters had to decide on whether ‘an applicant who declares 
himself/herself to be of Hungarian nationality [ethnicity]’ (cited in M. Kovács 2006, 431) 
should receive Hungarian citizenship, failed because of an insufficient turnout (37%). Among 
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those who voted, about 51.5% were in favour and 48.5% against, meaning that 81% of the 
Hungarian voters either did not want or did not care about granting citizenship to the diaspora 
abroad, thereby demonstrating a clear lack of ‘cultural solidarity’. Consequently, cultural 
explanations generally fail to account for the engagement of a government in diaspora politics 
and are widely dismissed in the academic discussion around Hungarian diaspora politics. 
Besides the culturalist trap, there is another argument that I would like to briefly discuss 
before moving forward. In fact, Rogers Brubaker’s ‘triadic nexus’ inspired numerous authors 
to study diaspora politics in Central and Eastern Europe and could in theory provide a point of 
departure to the analysis of Hungarian diaspora politics. The triadic nexus model posits that 
there are three main actors in diaspora politics: national minorities, the nationalising states in 
which they live, and their external national ‘homelands’ (Brubaker 1996). Tensions between 
states may arise as a result of the antagonism between the actors' divergent nationalisms: 
nationalising states may perceive themselves as not ‘national’ enough and ratify laws aimed at 
homogenising the population; national minorities may react against this perceived threat of 
assimilation; and external homelands may step in in order to defend ‘their’ co-nationals.  
Then, diaspora politics could be circumscribed to situations where ‘political or cultural 
elites define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claim 
that they “belong,” in some sense, to the state, and assert that their condition must be monitored 
and their interests protected and promoted by the state; and when the state actually does take 
action in the name of monitoring, promoting, or protecting the interests of its ethnonational kin 
abroad’ (Brubaker 1996, 58). The great strength of Brubaker's argument is its attention to 
presenting a multi-sided perspective on diaspora politics. Specifically, it accounts for the 
dynamics of diaspora politics, as both a result and a cause of interactions between different 
political actors. 
However, it is difficult to use this framework to analyse Hungarian diaspora politics 
between 2010 and 2019. Indeed, the role of Hungary's neighbours in shaping diaspora politics 
seems secondary in recent years. While the country frequently quarrelled with surrounding 
states between 1989 and 2010, I cannot identify any nationalising law passed by one of 
Hungary's neighbours in recent years that could have triggered the urge to develop diaspora 
politics in order to ‘protect’ the Hungarian diaspora.6 Accordingly, it is not relevant to appeal 
 
6. With the notable exception of Ukraine, which passed an education law in 2017 aimed at 
reinforcing the teaching of the Ukrainian language, to the detriment of minority languages 
(‘Ukraine: The Law on Education (Adopted by the Verkhovna Rada on 5 September 2017)’ 
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to exogenous factors to account for the development of diaspora politics in Hungary since 2010, 
and although I will draw on Brubaker’s seminal work later on, I will not directly mobilise the 
Brubakerian triadic nexus in this thesis. 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 should rather be understood as 
proper political processes, triggered by struggles in the domestic political field. Myra A. 
Waterbury was certainly the first to notice the temporal variation of intensity of Hungarian 
diaspora politics, and to correlate it with party politics. Indeed, ‘the priority given to the state-
diaspora relationship, the policy tools used to shape transnational support, and the level of 
involvement of the Hungarian state in supporting specific goals regarding the diaspora has 
differed significantly between regimes and governments’ (Waterbury 2006a, 67). In different 
studies, Waterbury points to the party struggles taking place behind every development in 
diaspora politics, with a particular emphasis on the late nineties/early two-thousands, and 
argues that diaspora politics in Hungary have historically been used by Fidesz in order to 
provide the party with ideological content, develop an organisational basis, and advance a long-
term strategy: 
First, they constructed and shaped the diaspora issue as primary to their party ideology 
and to Hungary’s future prosperity and cultural survival. This gave FIDESZ the 
historically grounded ideological content that it had previously lacked and provided the 
party with a way to win control over the definition of the nation during the election 
campaigns in 1998 and 2002. Second, FIDESZ’s approach to the diaspora issue was 
instrumental in the party’s strategy to remake itself as the vanguard of a broad right-
wing party bloc in an emerging dual-party system. FIDESZ’s action-oriented, 
aggressive, and clientelistic ‘nation policy’ (nemzetpolitika) provided the party with a 
much-needed network of transnational ties and a base of organization. This strategy 
solidified FIDESZ’s institutional embeddedness and offered a stylistic and ideological 
alternative to both the reconstituted Hungarian Socialists and the failed parties of the 
‘old’ right (Waterbury 2006b, 485). 
 
Accordingly, the Hungarian diaspora should be analysed as a ‘political tool’, a ‘political 
resource’, or a ‘tool of party and intra-group competition’, that is, a means to gain capital in 
the political field (Waterbury 2006a, 68). Namely, she identifies the different forms this capital 
can take: material (for instance to generate remittances), culturo-linguistic (to construct the 
boundaries of the nation), or political (to foster legitimacy and support) (Waterbury 2010a, 6). 
 
2017). Since then, Hungary has engaged in a diplomatic battle with its neighbour, on behalf of 
the Hungarian diaspora's rights to education in its mother-tongue (see for example Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty (2018)). However, this recent event evidently cannot explain the 
diaspora politics developed in the early 2010's.  
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Following Waterbury, Szabolcs Pogonyi pays equally close attention to domestic 
factors behind Hungarian diaspora politics. He analyses Hungarian diaspora politics since 2010 
as a ‘symbolic resource’, allowing the Orbán government to strengthen its political ‘nationalist’ 
identity at home (Pogonyi 2015). Pogonyi rules out economic or geopolitical causal 
explanations of the development of Fidesz's diaspora politics, and argues that ‘the main aim of 
the Hungarian centre-right party was to strengthen its nationalist image within the country as 
the radical populist Jobbik party emerged and started to challenge Fidesz from the right’ 
(Pogonyi 2015, 73). Pogonyi contends that 2010 constituted a shift in Hungarian diaspora 
politics, as they became embedded into a broader nationalist project imagined by Fidesz 
(Pogonyi 2015, 84). 
 
Significance of Diaspora Politics 
Diaspora politics are significant at several levels and deserve for this reason to be closely 
studied. In the literature, it is possible to identify different possible outcomes to diaspora 
politics: they may impact bilateral relations and international cooperation, may have an impact 
on alliance-building at the European level, and they may affect the results of state parliamentary 
elections or the claim-making capacity of minority party representatives. Crucially, a few 
studies found that diaspora politics also may influence the identification patterns of individuals. 
Anita Sobják showed that Hungarian diaspora politics, and their manifestation in 
foreign policy strategy, frequently led to tensions with Hungary’s neighbours in the Carpathian 
Basin (Sobják 2012). For instance, the Slovak government reacted to the amendment to the Act 
LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship (2012)—that allows preferential naturalisation for people 
identifying as Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin—by forbidding dual citizenship for Slovak 
citizens. On the other hand, Eamonn Butler also analysed diaspora politics as an important 
motivation for Hungary to lobby for the integration of its neighbours into the Euro-Atlantic 
system of cooperation (Butler 2007). 
At the level of the European Parliament, Waterbury found that relations between 
Hungarian MEPs and colleagues representing the Hungarian diaspora in Romania or Slovakia 
are significant enough to influence the choice of political group: the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ/UDMR), the Party of the Hungarian Community (SMK-
MKP), and Most–Híd all are or were part of the European People’s Party group when sitting 
in the Parliament (Waterbury 2016). 
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Moreover, diaspora politics also have a concrete impact on the result of elections in 
Hungary and elsewhere. In fact, non-resident citizenship, coupled with voting rights, modifies 
the size and the nature of the electoral body, and might therefore impact the results of domestic 
politics. Pogonyi, M. Kovács, and Körtvélyesi explain that ‘[e]xternal electoral groups may 
easily be mobilised by parties who want to stay in power, as has happened in Croatia repeatedly 
in elections in 1995, 2000 and 2007. Extending citizenship for external kin groups is a possible 
way to influence electoral outcomes. External dual citizens with voting rights, who do not bear 
the cost of political decisions, may determine the result of elections and thereby outvote certain 
parts of the domestic constituencies’ (Pogonyi, M. Kovács, and Körtvélyesi 2010, 13). In the 
case of Hungary, Mária Kovács argued even before the introduction of non-resident citizenship 
and voting rights in 2010–2011 that this possibility could significantly swing the political 
balance, given the size of the potential new voters' constituency (M. Kovács 2006, 438–440). 
And indeed, after non-resident citizenship coupled with voting rights was introduced in 
Hungary, Pogonyi showed that the majority of the non-resident voters decided to support 
Fidesz, as the diaspora saw non-resident citizenship as a gift from the party (Pogonyi 2017b, 
102). As a consequence,  
non-resident votes become very important in the final mandate allocation at the 2010 
[erratum: 2014] April parliamentary election. Fidesz received an overwhelming 95.5 
percent of these votes, while Jobbik had 2.3 and the left-wing alliance had 1.2 percent. 
On average, 87,901 votes on the national party list could be converted into one seat. 
Thus, the non-resident constituency’s votes secured Fidesz one seat in parliament. In 
the election, Fidesz won 133 seats – exactly the number necessary for an absolute 
majority. Without the seat won through non-resident votes, Fidesz would not have had 
an absolute majority. With two-thirds of the seats in Parliament, Fidesz may rewrite any 
laws including the Fundamental Law adopted in 2011 (Pogonyi 2017b, 104–105). 
 
 Besides domestic politics, a few authors have looked at the impact of diaspora politics 
on what is often coined ‘minority politics’. In different studies, Pogonyi (2017a and 2017b), 
Székely (2014), and Waterbury (2017) showed that diaspora politics impact on the diaspora's 
capacity to make claims and organise in the country of residence: ‘kin-citizenship creates new 
mobilization opportunity structures in the kin-state rather than in the home countries of 
minorities ... it provides political leverage to trans-border minorities in their kin-states, but at 
the same time, weakens their claim-making potential in their countries of residence’ (Pogonyi 
2017a, 245). 
 However, what is particularly crucial for this research is the significance of diaspora 
politics for individuals and groups’ patterns of identification. A few sociological studies have 
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investigated the impact on diaspora politics on the diaspora itself. As an example, Pogonyi 
investigated the consequences of the Hungarian diaspora politics on individuals living in 
Romania, Serbia, the United States, and Israel. In an article exploring the impact of non-
resident citizenship on the Hungarian diaspora members' identification patterns, he notably 
finds that ‘citizenship is still an important means of identity management ... besides the 
inevitable instrumental considerations, non-resident citizenship and passports are perceived as 
boundary making and un-making tools that enable their holders to claim Hungarian identity, 
and, at the same time, distinguish themselves from titular nationalities in her country of 
residence’ (Pogonyi 2019, 976). As Pogonyi argues, micro-level analyses allow scholars to 
identify the concrete implications of a political, state-driven decision on people's way of 
identifying.7 
Szilard-Istvan Pap, on the other side, studied the impact of a programme developed in 
the framework of diaspora politics, the Határtalanul! programme, that allows Hungarian high-
school students to visit regions populated by the Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin. 
Specifically, he analysed how this form of educational tourism affects the identity formation of 
the students participating in the programme, and argues that the programme ‘reinforce[s] the 
already existing ambiguous patterns of identification and differentiation between homeland 
Hungarians and their transborder co-ethnics, rather than fostering new, stronger forms of 
identification between them’ (Pap 2013, i). 
 Diaspora politics have a significance at several levels of the social world: on inter-state, 
international, and European relations (macro-level), on party politics and election results 
(mezzo-level), and crucially, on individuals’ understanding of their representations of and place 
in the social world (micro-level). It is this latter point that constitutes the basis for this thesis. 
If diaspora politics have an impact on social identification, it remains to determine how this 
medication of social practices and representations concretely takes place. In the following 
section, I will suggest that Pierre Bourdieu’s political theory provides a relevant framework to 
address this essential question.  
 
7. To have a complete overview of Pogonyi's findings on the issue, see Pogonyi (2017b, 
125–185). 
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1.2 Political Field, Principles of Di/Vision, and Political Representation(s) 
A Diaspora Political Field? 
Based on Waterbury and Pogonyi’s insights on the development of diaspora politics in Hungary, 
it may be argued that diaspora politics are waged in the political arena, or in a Bourdieusian 
framework, in the political field. Although Pierre Bourdieu has never devoted a book to politics, 
it is possible to have access to a sketch of a Bourdieusian political theory thanks to the work of 
John B. Thompson, who edited a book gathering Bourdieu's writings on language. Specifically, 
part III of Language and Symbolic Power, which presents texts on ‘Symbolic Power and the 
Political Field’ will constitute the basis on my analysis (Bourdieu 1991b). But before going 
further, I would like to briefly recall how Bourdieu understands the well-known concept of 
‘field’.  
Bourdieu sees the social space as multidimensional and compounded of several fields 
(champs) structurally identical, yet autonomous from each other. Each field is structured 
following the basic principles of economics: a field is a market where producers and consumers 
meet to acquire a product (capital) whose value on the market is determined by its scarcity. 
The basic principle of action is the maximisation of profit. As the distribution of the capital 
among the actors of the field is initially unequal, it follows that some actors dominate the 
market, while others are dominated. Moreover, this domination tends to reproduce itself, as the 
chances of maximising the profit are higher among actors who already own capital 
(accumulation). In fact, the actors who already own capital, because of this very reason, 
become capital producers, and have the capacity to determine the type of capital that is the 
most valuable on the market. In other words, they decide the rules of the game, based on the 
option that is most in their interests. Now, the type of capital sold and chased on a market is 
specific to each field. For example, within the cultural field, it is possible to identify producers 
(state, cultural institutions, schools, writers, etc.) and consumers (citizens, public, students, 
readers, etc.) ‘selling’ and ‘buying’ cultural capital, the specific form of capital circulating in 
the cultural field (Bourdieu 1979). 
While every field obeys these basic principles, the fields are also organised among, and 
competing between, each other. In the end, the economic field (and economic capital) always 
dominates the other fields (and therefore imposes onto them its structuration principles). Within 
and between the fields, struggles take place in order to modify the way field are structured, and 
to transform their power relations. In fact, social actors are involved in a game (jeu) taking the 
form of a symbolic struggle within a field, whose nevertheless real stake (enjeu) is the very 
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(re)definition of the rules of the games. As such, ‘every field is the site of a more or less openly 
declared struggle for the definition of the legitimate principles of division of the field’ 
(Bourdieu 1991d, 242). 
Based on these elements of the definition of a field, it is possible to think the existence 
of a political field, where political actors are competing for the domination of the field through 
the accumulation of political capital. In Bourdieu’s understanding, the political field should be 
analysed as a sub-field of the cultural field (Bourdieu 1991d, 236–237), where actors are 
specifically engaged in the production of meaning (sens) and representation of the social world, 
or rather competing meanings and representations of the social world (in the form of political 
programmes, analyses, concepts, events), among which the consumers (the citizens) must 
choose. 
This struggle only makes sense if one understands that in modern states, the political 
struggle ultimately aims at the control of the state, which only, argues Bourdieu, has the 
capacity to legitimately impose meanings and representations of the social world. The state 
institutions par excellence are the instruments of production, reproduction, and legitimation of 
the legitimate vision and division of the social world. Controlling the state is therefore 
tantamount to controlling the rules of the game for the rest of the society. Thus, the political 
struggle is 
at the same time a struggle for power over the 'public powers' (state administrations). 
In parliamentary democracies, the struggle to win the support of the citizens (their votes, 
their party subscriptions, etc.) is also a struggle to maintain or subvert the distribution 
of power over public powers (or, in other words, a struggle for the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of objectified political resources—law, the army, police, public finances, 
etc.). The most important agents of this struggle are the political parties, combative 
organizations specially adapted so as to engage in this sublimated form of civil war by 
mobilizing in an enduring way, through prescriptive predictions, the greatest possible 
number of agents endowed with the same vision of the social world and its future. So 
as to ensure that this enduring mobilization comes about, political parties must on the 
one hand develop and impose a representation of the social world capable of obtaining 
the support of the greatest possible number of citizens, and on the other hand win 
positions (whether of power or not) capable of ensuring that they can wield power over 
those who grant that power to them (Bourdieu 1991c, 181. Emphasis in the original). 
 
Although Bourdieu’s definition of the political field is still undoubtedly relevant to 
understand political dynamics nowadays, it might however have suffered from transformations 
in governance practices, particularly with the development of ill-named ‘transnational’ 
(transstate) institutions and forms of governance. Accordingly, it is a question whether states 
are still the sole actors with the capacity to legitimately impose the ‘correct’ representation of 
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the social world. Particularly in the case of diaspora politics, which are by nature transstate 
politics involving actors not only in Hungary but also in other states, the notion of political 
field—traditionally referring to domestic politics—seems insufficient to grasp the dynamics of 
diaspora politics. 
Therefore, it is useful to think of a diaspora political field that does not necessarily 
follow states boundaries. The diaspora political field could be understood as a sub-field of the 
political field, though only concerned with the question of the diaspora. With a similar rationale, 
Brubaker remarked in 1996 the usefulness of the concept of ‘national minority field’ to analyse 
actors and relations in minority politics: 
Using this notion [of field], developed and employed by Pierre Bourdieu in an 
impressive variety of studies, we can think of a national minority not as a fixed entity 
or a unitary group but rather in terms of the field of differentiated and competitive 
positions or stances adopted by different organizations, parties, movements, or 
individual political entrepreneurs, each seeking to ‘represent’ the minority to its own 
putative members, to the host state, or to the outside world, each seeking to monopolize 
the legitimate representation of the group. Competition in the representation of the 
group may occur not only among those making different claims for the group qua 
national minority, but also between those making such claims and those rejecting the 
designation ‘national minority’ and the family of claims associated with it (Brubaker 
1996, 61). 
 
A few years later, Brubaker went on to develop a similar vision of diaspora politics, without 
however explicitly suggesting the concept of a diaspora political field (Brubaker 2005). 
Yet, assuming a diaspora political field might be the only way to grasp the meaning of 
diaspora politics. Using this concept would allow us to overcome the difficulty of thinking of 
diaspora politics with the state as sole unit of analysis, and to include actors and institutions 
coming from other states. Moreover, it permits us to reflect on the power relationship between 
this field and the broader political field, particularly regarding its degree of autonomy. Lastly, 
it enables us to think upon the specific structure of the field, that is the rules of the game, and 
refrain from a simplistic reading of diaspora politics as subordinated to geopolitics, economics 
or party politics. Therefore, this research will posit a Hungarian diaspora political field, wherein 
diaspora political actors from different states are engaged. 
 
Visions and Di/Visions of the Diaspora National World? 
Drawing consequences from the previous reflections on the diaspora political field, I shall 
operate a redefinition of diaspora politics. According to Bourdieu, the actors in the political 
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field—political professionals—are competing and struggling to conserve or transform ‘the 
social world through the conservation or transformation of the vision of the social world and 
of the principles of di-vision of this world’ (Bourdieu 1991c, 181). In the diaspora political 
field, actors struggle to modify or conserve principles of vision and di/vision of a specific social 
group: the diaspora, though always in its relation to the nation. The diaspora indeed only has 
meaning in relation to the nation, be it to deny or uphold this relation. In other words, diaspora 
politics are not about the legitimate definition of the diaspora per se, but about the definition 
of the place of the diaspora in the nation. Thus, diaspora politics can be understood as a struggle 
between competing principles of di/vision of the national world. 
I would like to briefly define the concept of nation. An entire field of research having 
been dedicated to the study of nation and nationalism, it would be pointless to try to provide a 
literature review on the topic. Here, I will simply understand the nation as a sub-division of the 
social world, structured around two core principles: cultural sameness—ethnic, linguistic, 
historical, etc.— and on this ground, claim to political self-organisation. 
The division of the national world is operated through the magical act of nomination 
and classification, through the enactment of frontiers, borders, rules and decrees, through the 
division of reality and representations of this reality. In a beautiful article entitled ‘Identity and 
Representation: Elements for a Critical Reflection on the Idea of Region’, Bourdieu discusses 
the concept of region, and provides elements of analysis applicable to the concept of nation as 
well: 
What is at stake here is the power of imposing a vision of the social world through 
principles of di-vision which, when they are imposed on a whole group, establish 
meaning and a consensus about meaning, and in particular about the identity and unity 
of the group, which creates the reality of the unity and the identity of the group. The 
etymology of the word region (regio), as described by Emile Benveniste, leads to the 
source of the di-vision: a magical and thus essentially social act of diacrisis which 
introduces by decree a decisive discontinuity in natural continuity (between the regions 
of space but also between ages, sexes, etc.). Regere fines, the act which consists in 
'tracing out the limits by straight lines', in delimiting 'the interior and the exterior, the 
realm of the sacred and the realm of the profane, the national territory and foreign 
territory', is a religious act performed by the person invested with the highest authority, 
the rex, whose responsibility it is to regere sacra, to fix the rules which bring into 
existence what they decree, to speak with authority, to pre-dict in the sense of calling 
into being, by an enforceable saying, what one says, of making the future that one utters 
come into being. The regio and its frontiers (fines) are merely the dead trace of the act 
of authority which consists in circumscribing the country, the territory (which is also 
called fines), in imposing the legitimate, known and recognized definition (another 
sense of finis) of frontiers and territory - in short, the source of legitimate di-vision of 
the social world. This rightful act, consisting in asserting with authority a truth which 
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has the force of law, is an act of cognition which, being based, like all symbolic power, 
on recognition, brings into existence what it asserts (auctoriras, as Benveniste again 
reminds us, is the capacity to produce which is granted to the auctor). Even when he 
merely states with authority what is already the case, even when he contents himself 
with asserting what is, the auctor produces a change in what is: by virtue of the fact that 
he states things with authority, that is, in front of and in the name of everyone, publicly 
and officially, he saves them from their arbitrary nature, he sanctions them, sanctifies 
them, consecrates them, making them worthy of existing, in conformity with the nature 
of things, and thus 'natural' (Bourdieu 1991a, 221-222. Emphases in the original). 
 
 The political actors invested with the authority to see and foresee have the power to 
make into being, to inscribe in the reality their visions and divisions of the social territory. Thus, 
politics are the space where the delineation of the social world are at stake. Accordingly, 
diaspora politics aim at the conservation or the modification of principles of vision and division 
of the national world. Indeed, the central question to diaspora politics is where to draw the line, 
where to trace the frontier, how to divide between the diaspora and the nation.  
 
A Struggle For and Of Representation(s) 
 Concretely, diaspora politics consist of a struggle for and of representations of the 
diaspora. First, diaspora politics are a struggle for representation. Actors involved in the field 
are engaged in a struggle to represent the diaspora, that is, to be recognised as the legitimate 
representatives of the group, to embody the legitimate diaspora representation.  
This is a consequence of the structuring of the political field. On the one hand, it benefits 
from a relative autonomy from the rest of the fields. This has particularly become salient during 
the constitution of the modern state, with its array of specifically political institutions (Bourdieu 
1991c). The political practice then became the exclusive domain of political practitioners and 
professionals, trained to maximise their acquisition of political capital. On the other hand, the 
political field reproduces in its heart the symbolic struggles taking place outside of it, because 
it is vitally linked to the fate and interests of those whom it represents (Bourdieu 1991c, 171). 
Thus, actors playing within the field need to represent, and thus mobilise, as many people as 
possible because the capacity of representation of political actors is the specific form of capital 
circulating in the political field. In the diaspora political field, actors are competing to become 
the legitimate representative of the diaspora. 
Second, diaspora politics are a struggle of representations. Actors involved in the field 
aim to alter reality (the national practices) by altering the representations of this reality. They 
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seek ‘to make people see and believe, to get them to know and recognize, to impose the 
legitimate definition of the divisions of the social world and, thereby, to make and unmake 
group’ (Bourdieu 1991a, 221. Emphasis in the original). Here, I understand national practices 
as the whole of social and political practices that are represented and articulated through the 
identification to a nation, for instance suffrage, celebrations, gatherings, etc.  
The making of the diaspora takes place as soon as its existence is uttered, because the 
act of nominating presupposes the existence of the diaspora in social practices. The diaspora 
representative produces the representation (‘this is the Hungarian diaspora’) of the group it 
seeks to represent (the Hungarian diaspora), with the hope of giving the probable diaspora 
group of a political existence, therefore ensuring its own legitimation. Bourdieu explains that 
‘the speech of the spokesperson owes part of its 'illocutionary force' to the force (the number) 
of the group that he helps to produce as such by the act of symbolization or representation; it 
is based on the metaphorical coup d'état by which the speaker invests his utterance with all the 
power his utterance helps to produce by mobilizing the group to which it is addressed’ 
(Bourdieu 1991c, 191. Emphasis in the original). Political representatives donnent corps (give 
body/give substance) to the diaspora when they represent it, because this very action of 
representation implies the production of an image of the group, of the identity and unity of 
otherwise differentiated actors. Consequently, 
political representation produces and reproduces, at every moment, a derivative form 
of the argument of the bald King of France so dear to logicians: any predicative 
statement with 'the working class' as its subject conceals an existential statement (there 
is a working class). More generally, all statements which have as their subject a 
collective—People, Class, University, School, State, etc.—presuppose that the question 
of the existence of the group has been solved and conceal that sort of 'metaphysical 
fallacy' which has been criticized in the ontological argument. The spokesperson is the 
person who, speaking about a group, speaking on behalf of a group, surreptitiously 
posits the existence of the group in question, institutes the group, through that magical 
operation which is inherent in any act of naming. That is why we must proceed to a 
critique of political reason—a reason which is inclined to commit abuses of language 
which are abuses of power—if we want to raise the question with which all sociology 
ought to begin, that of the existence and mode of existence of collectives (Bourdieu, 
1991d, 250. Emphasis in the original). 
 
But the construction of the diaspora is also elaborated through the manipulation of 
representations of reality, in our case diaspora representations. By showing, picturing, 
demonstrating, drawing, writing the diaspora, diaspora representatives produce mental images 
and representations of the diaspora. In turn, these representations are likely to affect social 
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practices, that is, the way people perceive and interact with the world. Thus, political 
representations are crucial in constructing the social world because they are ‘instruments for 
perceiving and expressing the social world’ (Bourdieu 1991c, 172). 
Diaspora politics can therefore be understood as a struggle of diaspora representations, 
in the sense that actors are fighting to produce, reproduce and legitimate their representations 
of the diaspora. Following Bourdieu, the role of sociology would be to account for this struggle 
over the representation of the diaspora, and when describing the social reality, to include ‘the 
representation of reality, or, more precisely, the struggle over representations, in the sense of 
mental images, but also of social demonstrations whose aim it is to manipulate mental images 
(and even in the sense of delegations responsible for organizing the demonstrations that are 
necessary to modify mental representations)’ (Bourdieu 1991a, 221). Accordingly, this thesis 
will take for research object the representations of the diaspora produced in the diaspora 
political field. 
 
⁂ 
 
In this chapter, I highlighted the conceptual contribution that Pierre Bourdieu’s writings can 
bring to the study of diaspora politics. Based on the literature, I started by laying out a definition 
of diaspora politics, presented various disciplinary approaches to diaspora politics, and 
underlined the significance of the phenomenon at macro-, mezzo-, and micro-levels. Then, I 
aimed to show that Bourdieu’s concepts of political field, principles of di/vision and political 
representation(s) could provide a relevant theoretical basis to understand how diaspora politics 
contribute to the production and reproduction of the nation. Namely, positing a diaspora 
political field enables us to overcome shortcomings of the domestic political field in the study 
of transstate processes such as diaspora politics. Moreover, diaspora politics can be re-
conceptualised as a struggle to impose the legitimate visions and divisions of the national world. 
Finally, the concept of political representation provides a methodological frame for the study 
of nation-production. Diaspora politics are a struggle for, but also of representations. Thus, 
interrogating the production of the national world implies the examination of the 
representations of the national world. 
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Chapter 2. Methodological Aspects 
This research mostly draws on qualitative methods, namely content analysis of textual objects 
(laws, documents, articles, publications). The study object – representations – informed this 
methodological choice. In fact, quantitative analysis appeared ill-suited to catch the production 
and reproduction of representations in Hungarian diaspora politics. Representations can hardly 
be quantified, insofar as they are made of images, sounds, words and sentences. They are visual 
in nature, in the broad sense of the term – they are visions of an abstract concept: the diaspora. 
Thus, analysing representations implies their description and their reconstitution through 
language, or in a word, their interpretation, that only qualitative analysis can achieve. The 
research question, method and data used to elaborate the arguments in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4 differ, and I shall present them separately thereafter. 
Chapter 3 aims to answer how the development of a legal and institutional framework 
to Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 has enabled the production and 
reproduction of new national representations. Therefore, the methodology used in Chapter 3 
reflects the concern to reflect on political processes taking place over time, namely the 
establishment of institutional actors, the creation of a legal framework, as well as their role in 
the re/production of national representations. With this aim in mind, I performed content 
analysis on laws and legal documents, political declarations and strategic documents, 
institutions and administrative departments, programmes, and media articles and publications 
produced or created in the framework of Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019.  
The definition of the dataset was a challenging enterprise. While diaspora politics is a 
rich theoretical concept, it may be difficult to operationalise. How and where, indeed, is it 
appropriate to bind the realm of diaspora politics? Two challenges had to be overcome. First, I 
had to select data that would allow the discussion of representations within the diaspora 
political field – and make sure not to collect elements of ‘regular’ nationalist politics. Second, 
I had to think of what sort of empirical objects can be considered political – a theoretical puzzle 
on its own. In order to palliate to these issues, I initially used the definition and examples of 
diaspora politics provided by authors in the literature (King and Melvin 1999; Pogonyi 2015; 
Ragazzi 2014; Waterbury 2009; Waterbury 2010a), that I developed in Chapter 1. Meanwhile 
reading and exploring documents and the websites of institutions, I found furthermore that this 
definition and these examples were not enough to embrace the multitude of objects I came 
across. Therefore, I decided to add elements that I had not previously seen commented on in 
the literature on diaspora politics. Overall, the main criterion I retained to select the data was 
28 
 
not its nature, but its purpose – representing the relation between the Hungarian diaspora and 
nation, and the specific timeframe I defined (2010-2019). 
I collected the data in two steps. First, I undertook a significant period of secondary 
research whereby I collected elements in academic articles and publications. Studies by Zsuzsa 
Csergő and James M. Goldgeier (2013), Zoltán Kántor (2014), Eszter Kovács (2014; 2019), 
Szabolcs Pogonyi (2015; 2017a; 2017b), Myra A. Waterbury (2014) were particularly useful 
to start collecting political developments in Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 
2019. Second, throughout the research itself, I discovered new elements of data. Particularly 
after the discovery of the National Register websites where I found a database of documents,8 
I was not only able to use these documents as research data, but also to find out about other 
policies or institutions they mention. In order to keep track of the data collected, I constituted 
a table, where I indicated the name of the element, year, type (law, document, institution, 
programme or media), and initiator (see table 1). Moreover, I needed data on what had 
happened in diaspora politics before 2010 in order to provide a background to contrast the 
developments that took place after 2010. Thus, Chapter 3 is also partly based on secondary 
research on the history of diaspora politics (Bárdi 2004; Csergő 2005; M. Kovács 2006; 
Waterbury 2006a; 2006b; 2010a). 
There are two main limits to the analysis of Chapter 3. On the one hand, despite my 
efforts to carefully identify and collect data in a comprehensive manner, there is a possibility I 
missed certain elements. Part of this limit stems from the linguistic obstacle with the Hungarian 
language: while I could generally navigate Hungarian-language websites and documents, I 
could not understand the details. Thus, it is possible that table 1 is not exhaustive. On the other 
hand, the dataset gathered was so vast that it was not possible to undertake a systematic analysis 
of the data within the allotted time of the research. Being systematic would have required me 
to consult thousands of textual and visual elements, and I could not allocate enough time to 
undertake this analysis. 
However, with regard to the research question of Chapter 3, I believe that these two 
limits are not major impediments to the relevance of the analysis. In fact, Chapter 3 aims to 
provide the reader with a general overview of the developments in Hungarian diaspora politics 
between 2010 and 2019, and to contrast it with previous developments. Although the lack of 
exhaustivity may cause some objection, I trust the number of elements gathered to be sufficient 
 
8. See https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/documents.  
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to illustrate the 2010 rupture in Hungarian diaspora politics. Moreover, Chapter 3 is meant to 
provide a basis for reflection on the role of diaspora politics institutions and laws in the 
re/production of national representations. Therefore, the scope of the chapter can be described 
as theoretical, rather than purely empirical. The elements I bring to the discussion are meant to 
illustrate my argument and give examples of the processes behind the re/production of national 
representations. 
Chapter 4 partly attempts to address this previous issue of non-systematicity. The last 
chapter of this thesis inquires how visions and divisions of the national world are represented 
and legitimated by actors engaged in the diaspora political field, based on a case study of 
Minority Studies, a journal edited by NPKI between 2013 and 2016. In order to answer this 
question, I undertook content analysis of a sample constituted of 43 articles published in an 
English-language social-scientific journal, Minority Studies, edited by the Research Institute 
for Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI) between 2013 and 2016. In total, the number of 
pages analysed was about 600. The articles are all written in English and can generally be 
considered to match the academic format. An overview of the articles, containing their titles, 
authors, publication year, issue number, as well as a reference code that I will use in the analysis 
can be found in table 2 (see annex). Because of the diversity of the articles, it is difficult to give 
a general overview of the data sample. It is nevertheless possible to say that most of the articles 
are concerned with sociological or political issues, such as elections, demographics, education, 
diaspora politics, and inter-ethnic relations. Moreover, a relative majority of the articles directly 
and indirectly deal with the Hungarian diaspora or Hungarian nation, while the rest of the 
articles present the situation of diaspora politics in countries other than Hungary. 
I selected NPKI and Minority Studies as the basis of my analysis for several reasons. I 
first had to make a choice between the different institutions created in the framework of 
diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019, and NPKI appeared to be the most relevant option. 
NPKI is a research institute founded in 2013 and funded by the Bethlen Gábor Fund – the 
financial arm of the Hungarian government’s diaspora politics. In practice, NPKI functions as 
the ‘in-house’ think tank of the Hungarian government regarding matters of diaspora politics 
(‘Az Intézet (The Institute)’ n.d.). NPKI has a direct role in the elaboration of a coherent, 
unified and centralised diaspora political strategy since 2010, as witnessed by its participation 
in the elaboration of both of the key documents presenting the government’s' strategy regarding 
the Hungarian diaspora (‘Policy for Hungarian Communities Abroad: Strategic Framework for 
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Hungarian Communities Abroad’ 2013; ‘Hungarian Diaspora Policy: Strategic Directions’ 
2016). 
Whilst NPKI undertakes research on the Hungarian diaspora and diaspora politics 
(production of representations), it is also very active in the reproduction of these 
representations through education, publications and events. For instance, NPKI trains future 
Hungarian civil servants, publishes textbooks to provide them with the basics of the ‘Nation 
Policy’, and is involved in other similar initiatives. Furthermore, NPKI organises events such 
as summer schools and national and international conferences, engaging an audience that goes 
way further than the research institution. Last but not least, NPKI publishes and edits textual 
content in the form of books, journals, media reviews and analyses in Hungarian, English, and 
sometimes in other languages. 
Thus, the representations produced by NPKI circulate widely in Hungary and beyond, 
within the political and social-scientific fields: the national representations produced by NPKI 
are offered to Hungarian civil servants and politicians active in the Hungarian political field, 
to foreign policymakers, possibly working for international organisations such as the European 
Union, the OSCE or the Council of Europe, and to the social-scientific community in Hungary 
and abroad. In sum, the outreach of NPKI is far from negligible, and the research institute can 
be considered a key means of production and reproduction of the ‘Hungarian nation’ between 
2010 and 2019. As such, it constitutes a significant object of investigation. 
Second, Minority Studies particularly appeared relevant to the investigation of 
representations in the diaspora political field. The publication is bound in time (2013-2016), 
facilitating the emergence of a ‘big picture’, and the number of articles – 43 – was judged 
important enough to contain recurring themes and representations. On the contrary, the other 
English-language journal published by NPKI, Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies, is still 
published, has only two issues (2017 and 2018), and reproduces several articles already 
published in Minority Studies. 
Moreover, Minority Studies arguably provides a balanced picture of the representations 
produced in the Hungarian diaspora political field since 2010. On the one hand, it was edited 
and overseen by NPKI, necessarily reflecting the institution’s agenda, and by extension the 
Hungarian government’s agenda. On the other hand, articles in Minority Studies were written 
not only by NPKI researchers, but also by authors coming from diverse states and backgrounds. 
The journal features the work of writers coming from academia and political organisations, in 
Hungary and abroad (see table 3 in annex). Whilst a little more than half of the authors (57%) 
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were affiliated or partly affiliated with institutions in Hungary, the rest came from Romania, 
Ukraine, Slovakia, and other countries in Europe and beyond. As for their professional 
occupation, half the authors were engaged in academic institutions only, while the other half 
worked for political institutions, para-political organisations9 (including NPKI), or mixed the 
occupations. Thus, Minority Studies is a ‘digest’ of the Hungarian diaspora political field – not 
restrained to Hungary nor to politics. 
Due to the purpose of academic journals–research dissemination–collecting the data 
was not a major issue. The articles constituting the basis of my analysis were initially retrieved 
from the NPKI website, where the four issues of Minority Studies are available.10 However, it 
soon appeared that some articles were missing, and I then turned to the website of Lucidus 
Kiadó, the publishing house that co-edited Minority Studies with NPKI between 2013 and 
2016.11 As for the authors’ affiliations, most of them were indicated by the end of the issue. In 
the few cases this information was not available, I performed a web search, and sought to 
identify the affiliation of the author at the time of the publication. Moreover, in order to 
determine the state where an institution is based, I looked up the information on the Internet. 
 All the data collected went through content and thematic analysis. This analysis 
unfolded between an inductive and deductive period. First, I entirely read and took notes on all 
the articles to familiarise myself with the data, as well as to start identifying recurring themes 
and ideas. Based on these first impressions, I started elaborating a codebook, where I gathered 
themes and linked them to keywords I had encountered in the texts. In a back and forth 
movement between the texts and the themes, I wrote a first analysis of the types of 
representations offered in Minority Studies. Noting the emergence of oppositions in my 
analysis, I then reflected on how I could use the concept of 'principles of di/vision' to further 
my analysis. As Gorski noted, ‘the backslash serves two functions: first, it marks the connection 
between the mental maps, or visions, that exist in people’s minds and the us/them boundaries 
 
9. By para-political organisations, I include organisations with no political mandate, but 
arguably active in the political field, such as think tanks or NGOs.  
 
10 . See https://bgazrt.hu/nemzetpolitikai-kutatointezet/folyoiratok/minority-studies-2012-
2015/.  
 
11 . The 15th issue can be found at the following address: 
http://www.lucidus.hu/pdf/minres/mr-15.pdf. The 16th issue can be found here: 
http://www.lucidus.hu/pdf/minres/mr-16.pdf. The 17th issue can be found here: 
http://www.lucidus.hu/pdf/minres/mr-17.pdf. Finally, articles from the 18th issue can be found 
separately on this webpage: http://epa.oszk.hu/00400/00463/00018/pdf/. 
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(di-visions) that are re/produced in and through interaction; second, it emphasizes that these 
principles are ultimately premised on binary oppositions (high/low, coarse/fine, male/female, 
and so forth) (visions), which create opposed perceptions of social reality (di-vision)’ (Gorski 
2013, 254). From there, I re-organised my codebook around binary oppositions, deduced 
possible keywords to look for, and undertook a second research period. 
 In order to create statistics on the occurrence of a theme, I created a table where I linked 
code to articles (see table 4 in annex). This process was made manually, meaning that I used 
the computer research function to look for the key words identified, and set aside the articles 
containing the keywords. Then, I personally double-checked the relevance of linking an article 
with a code, in order to identify possible mismatches (for example an article containing the 
word ‘division’ in a meaning unrelated to divisions in the diaspora). I should also add that I 
split the data into two main groups: one concerned with Hungary or Hungarians (‘Hungaro-
centred’) and another one dealing with any other theme (such as European law or French 
diaspora politics). The content and thematic analysis was therefore primarily carried out in the 
first group, in order not to lose time and ‘corrupt’ my statistics on the salience of a specific 
issue or theme. I indicate in the analysis when the statistics take into account the whole sample 
or the Hungaro-centred sample only. 
 The limitation to the analysis of Chapter 4 is three-fold. First, the analysis of the 
oppositions contained in the articles of Minority Studies is arguably non-exhaustive. For 
instance, each text could have been analysed on its own, and the level of details and subtlety 
refined. However, I believe this non-exhaustivity does not question the relevance of the 
analysis. In fact, I sought to provide a broad picture of the principles of di/vision contained in 
Minority Studies, in order to uncover the ‘common sense’ that the publication produces and 
reproduces. Second, manual coding carries the risk of missing on themes or relevant ideas, 
while mismatching articles with themes. This in turn may affect the accuracy of the statistics 
produced. This research being primarily based on qualitative analysis, referring to an inaccurate 
number should not put at risk the rest of the argument, but simply affect the relevance of the 
statistical illustration. Third, the qualitative nature of the analysis makes it sensitive to the 
researcher’s biases. For instance, it may be objected that the significance of certain themes was 
overestimated in regard to others. While the risk of bias is present for any scientific study, I 
aimed to tackle the issue through transparency. Accordingly, table 4 provides an overview of 
the overall salience of each theme in Minority Studies and gives the reader the opportunity to 
find out about the significance and the location of each point discussed. 
33 
 
 
Chapter 3. Laws and Institutions in Hungarian Diaspora Politics (2010–2019) 
In this third chapter, I will ask how the development of a legal and institutional framework to 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 has enabled the production and 
reproduction of new national representations. In order to answer this question, I will present 
the major laws, documents, institutions, programmes and media that have constituted 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019. I will argue that the diaspora political 
field existing before 2010 was co-opted and restructured by Fidesz-KDNP following its 
accession to power. This restructuring unfolded in two steps: through the creation of a new 
legal framework legitimating the unification of the diaspora with the Hungarian nation, and 
through the development of institutions representing the diaspora, and therefore apt to produce 
and reproduce new national representations. 
 I will first show that the development of a Hungarian diaspora political field started 
with the democratic transition in the nineties. However, I will then defend that the accession to 
power of a new party in 2010 marked a new period in the history of Hungarian diaspora politics, 
wherein a comprehensive legal framework was developed, and institutions gained significance. 
At the same time, I will analyse how this legal and institutional framework allow the production, 
reproduction and legitimation of representations. 
 
3.1 Early Developments of the Diaspora Political Field in Post-Communist Hungary 
(1989–2010) 
Here, I would like to briefly sketch the development of Hungarian diaspora politics before 2010. 
As the topic has already been extensively developed in the literature,12 I will not provide an 
exhaustive overview, but seek to pinpoint key developments to give a basis for comparison 
with diaspora politics from 2010. 
It is possible to identify the antecedents of contemporary Hungarian diaspora politics 
as soon as 1920, year of the Treaty of Trianon. Soon after the signature of the Trianon Peace 
 
12. Bárdi (2004) offers an excellent overview of the Hungarian government's stance 
towards the Hungarians beyond the borders between 1920 and 1989. See also Pritz (2010 and 
2011). For a discussion of the Hungarian Foreign Policy between 1918 and 1945, see Balogh 
(1988). For a discussion of the communist period, see Kende (1988) and Ludanyi (1995). As 
for developments in post-communist Hungary, see again Bárdi (2004), Waterbury (2010a) and 
Pogonyi (2017b). 
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Treaty, Albert Apponyi, head of the Hungarian delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, 
declared that the newly established Hungarian state ‘ought to try to render valid the rights and 
prerogatives assured them by the treaty [of Trianon], particularly the minorities’ rights of their 
kindred in the territories severed from Hungary’ (Apponyi 1921, 8). Apponyi thereby 
politically gave birth to the Hungarian diaspora, deserving political representation and 
protection from the Hungarian state. The commitment to defend the rights of the diaspora soon 
evolved into a revisionist strategy that led the Hungarian government to side with Nazi 
Germany during World War II, with the hope of reintegrating the diaspora within the borders 
of Hungary. After being defeated by the Soviet Union in 1945, Hungary entered its communist 
period, lasting until the end of the eighties. At that time, there were no diaspora politics at the 
government level, and the diaspora officially did not exist, in order to preserve the system of 
alliances between the states of the Eastern bloc. By the end of the seventies, the Hungarian 
diaspora had re-gained political momentum as it became increasingly mobilised by political 
opponents to the communist power. 
However, it would be misleading to read the current diaspora politics as the simple 
continuation of 20th century developments. Indeed, the democratic transition from 1989 
onwards brought a new political system, with new actors and opportunities, and led the 
forthcoming governments to develop diaspora politics. The birth of a post-communist diaspora 
political field in Hungary can be dated to 1989, when the Hungarian Constitution was amended 
to include a reference to Hungarians beyond the borders: ‘The Republic of Hungary bears a 
sense of responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside its borders and shall promote 
and foster their relations with Hungary’ (Act XX of 1949 The Constitution of the Republic of 
Hungary 1989), symbolically binding the fate of the newly established Hungarian state to the 
Hungarian diaspora. A year after, Prime Minister Jószef Antall (1990–1993) declared: ‘I want 
to act as the head of the government of all the citizens of this 10 million strong country, but in 
spirit and sentiment as the prime minister of 15 million Hungarians’ (Jeszenszky 2008, 29), 
opening the path towards integrating the Hungarian diaspora into the nation. The Antall 
government established the defence of the diaspora as one of the three pillars to the new 
Hungarian foreign policy, alongside Euro-Atlantic integration and good neighbourly relations 
(Varga 2000). 
 In 1996, the Horn government (1994–1998) organised the first Hungarian-Hungarian 
Summit (Magyar-Magyar Csúcstalálkozó), gathering representatives of the government, other 
Hungarian parties, and representatives of diaspora political parties in the surrounding states, to 
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discuss the best way to support ‘Magyarország és a határon túli magyar közösségek együttes 
érdekeit, azaz a magyar nemzet érdekeit’ (’the joint interests of Hungary and of the Hungarians 
beyond the borders, that is, the interests of the Hungarian nation’) (‘A Magyar-Magyar 
Csúcstalálkozó Közös Nyilatkozata (Joint Declaration of the Hungarian-Hungarian Summit)’ 
1996, 159). For Nándor Bárdi, this event marks the beginning of the ‘political 
institutionalisation of Hungarian-Hungarian relations and the development of a system of 
cultural institutions of the Hungarian nation perceived in ethnocultural terms’ (Bárdi 2004, 62). 
Moreover, the organisation of a first Hungarian-Hungarian summit is significant because it 
contributed to politically representing the Hungarian nation as a conglomerate between the 
Hungarian state and the Hungarian diaspora. Gyula Horn also saw diaspora politics as a matter 
of economic development and regional cooperation. For instance, it developed the New 
Handshake Foundation (Új Kézfogás Alapítvány) in order to assist ‘in capital investments, 
interest-rate subsidies, the training of entrepreneurs and cooperation in economic development 
along both sides of the border’ (Bárdi 2004, 70), and handled the protection of diaspora's 
minority rights through the signature of bilateral treaties with Hungary's neighbours.13 
 With the first Orbán government (1998–2002), diaspora politics kept developing. The 
Hungarian-Hungarian Summit was transformed into the Hungarian Standing Conference 
(Magyar Állandó Értekezlet—MÁÉRT) from 1998 and re-conducted on a yearly basis. The 
government also made a first attempt at opening the Hungarian political community to the 
Hungarian diaspora through the so-called Status Law in 2001, provoking real turmoil at the 
domestic, regional, and European levels, including the involvement of international 
organisations such as the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and the European Union.14 The law 
aimed at granting special cultural, educational and socio-economic benefits in Hungary to 
 
13 . The government signed bilateral treaties with Slovakia in 1995 (Treaty on Good-
Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-Operation between the Republic of Hungary and the 
Slovak Republic 1995) and Romania in 1996 (Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good 
Neighbourliness between Romania and the Republic of Hungary 1996). In the two treaties, the 
parties recognise the legitimacy of their common borders, and agree to abandon any revisionist 
ambition. They also include provisions on minority protection, remaining strictly within the 
scope of international organisations treaties on minority rights. Agreements on minority 
protection were also signed with Croatia in 1995 and Slovenia in 1996 (Varga 2000). 
 
14. For an overview of the legal, philosophical and political debates around the Status Law, 
see the exhaustive volume edited by Kántor et al. (2004). 
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‘persons declaring themselves to be of Hungarian nationality15 who are not Hungarian citizens 
and who have their residence in the Republic of  Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 
Romania, the Republic of Slovenia, the Slovak Republic or the Ukraine’ (Act LXII of 2001 on 
Hungarians Living in Neighbouring States 2001). In other words, the law was designed to offer 
a ‘fuzzy citizenship’ to the Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin (Fowler 2004). 
In the following years of socialist-liberal coalition led by Péter Medgyessy (2002–
2004), Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004–2009) and Gordon Bajnai (2010), the diaspora political field 
was arguably re-organised alongside different principles. The Status Law was amended in 2003. 
Moreover, the only institution specifically dealing with the diaspora and providing a meeting 
space between the Hungarian state and the Hungarian diaspora, MÁÉRT, stopped convening 
in 2004. A new institution was instead put into place in 2004, the Forum of Hungarian 
Representatives from the Carpathian Basin (Kárpát-medencei Magyar Képviselők Fóruma–
KMKF). According to its statutes, the role of KMKF is to formulate recommendations to 
Hungarian state institutions in order to improve cooperation between the states of the region, 
making it similar to MÁÉRT, yet it only welcomes members of parliament (‘Kárpát-medencei 
Magyar Képviselők Fóruma 2006-2010: Nemzetpolitikai Konszenzus Dokumentumokban 
(Forum of Hungarian Representatives from the Carpathian Basin 2006-2010: Nation Policy 
Consensus in Documents)’ 2011, 304-206). While ‘swapping’ MÁÉRT for KMKF, the 
government arguably decided to suppress the development of a platform increasingly loyal to 
Fidesz and attempted to create an alternative space that was more easily controlled.  
In fact, even though Fidesz lost the elections in 2002, it kept pushing for diaspora 
politics in the opposition. In 2004, it supported a referendum initiated by the diaspora 
organisation Federation of World Hungarians (Magyarok Világszövetsége). The referendum 
asked Hungarian voters to decide on the following question: ‘Do you wish that Parliament pass 
a law which would enable an applicant who declares himself/herself to be of Hungarian 
nationality, but is not a Hungarian citizen and does not live in Hungary, to enjoy the right of 
preferential naturalization at his/her request, provided he/she can provide proof of his/her 
Hungarian nationality with the possession of a “Hungarian identity card” issued on grounds of 
Law LXII.19, 2001, or in any other way to be determined by the law?’ (cited in M. Kovács 
2006, 431). In simpler words, the referendum was offering the possibility to obtain a non-
 
15. In Hungarian, or in the English translation, it is common to use the term ‘nationality’ to 
refer to what would be rather called ‘ethnicity’ elsewhere. Therefore, when this term appears, 
it should not be understood as denoting citizenship, but cultural Hungarianness. 
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resident Hungarian citizenship for diaspora members. The ‘yes’ was supported by Fidesz and 
diaspora organisations, while the ‘no’ was supported by the Hungarian government. The 
referendum eventually failed because the turnout threshold was not reached (only 37% of the 
electorate cast its ballot; about 51.5% in favour, 48.5% against) (M. Kovács 2006, 436). 
In sum, the democratic transition in Hungary led to the progressive development of a 
diaspora political field, with transstate actors and institutions. However, while the first 
institutions dealing with diaspora politics were created (MÁÉRT, KMKF) between 1989 and 
2010, the frequent changes of government prevented the stabilisation and wider 
institutionalisation of diaspora politics and diaspora actors until 2010.  
 
3.2 ‘We the nation’: Legal Framework for Hungarian Diaspora Politics (2010–2019) 
The establishment of a new government dominated by Fidesz-KDNP in 2010 led to the 
development of an important legal framework for diaspora politics. Most emblematically, a 
new constitution—the Fundamental Law of Hungary—came into effect in 2012, replacing the 
Hungarian constitution of 1949, which had simply been amended during Hungary’s democratic 
transition in 1989. The vote on a new constitution has been widely commented on in the 
literature,16 because ‘the way the text was drafted as well as the content of the text itself, 
according to many views, are in conflict with some of the basic features of democratic 
constitutionalism … it is biased in favour of the winners of the 2010 elections and against 
everybody else. It provides a mythical historical narrative that goes against the grain of 
republican traditions. It prefers Catholics to non-believers and followers of other faiths’ (G. 
Tóth 2012, IX). 
More crucially for the topic of diaspora politics, the Fundamental Law represents the 
Hungarian nation as ‘torn apart in the storms of the last century’ and includes an explicit 
reference to the Hungarian diaspora. Article D reads ‘[b]earing in mind that there is one single 
Hungarian nation that belongs together, Hungary shall bear responsibility for the fate of 
Hungarians living beyond its borders, shall facilitate the survival and development of their 
communities, shall support their efforts to preserve their Hungarian identity, the effective use 
of their individual and collective rights, the establishment of their community self-governments, 
and their prosperity in their nativelands, and shall promote their cooperation with each other 
 
16. See for instance Szente, Mandák, and Fejes (2015), G. Tóth (2012), Körtvélyesi (2012), 
Vincze and Varju (2012). 
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and with Hungary’ (The Fundamental Law of Hungary 2011). In this paragraph, it is possible 
to analyse a tension between the division and the unity of the Hungarian nation. In fact, the 
Hungarian diaspora is both represented as detached from the Hungarian state (‘Hungarians 
living beyond its borders’) and dissolved into the concept of nation (‘one single Hungarian 
nation that belongs together’). The redundancy of the latter sentence emphasises the fact that 
the assumption is not consensual (otherwise there would be no need to state it) and highlights 
the role of the new constitution in legitimating new representations of the Hungarian nation. 
Controversially, the constitution also performs a distinction between the Hungarian 
nation and the Hungarian citizenry, whereby it becomes unclear who ‘owns’ the Hungarian 
state. As Zsolt Körtvélyesi explains, the Hungarian Fundamental Laws ‘seems to rest on a 
distinction between the source of the constitution-making authority (pouvoir constituant): the 
source of the constitution on the one hand, and those entitled to exercise political rights, on the 
other. Ethnic Hungarians are part of the “nation”, under the terms of the Fundamental Law, 
while non-ethnic Hungarians who are nonetheless citizens of Hungary are part of the “political 
community” only’ (Körtvélyesi 2012, 116-117. Emphasis in the original). The new 
Fundamental Law thus reinforces the conceptual confusion between nation and state. With 
regards to further developments, it is possible to analyse this confusion as an attempt to ‘give 
back’ the sovereignty over the Hungarian state to an extended Hungarian nation – as opposed 
to the earlier constitution based on the a conception of the nation as bound in the Hungarian 
citizenry (Körtvélyesi 2012). This reading can be confirmed by the vote of new laws on 
citizenship and voting rights in 2010 and 2011 respectively. But before presenting them, I 
would like to briefly mention another legal text. 
Namely, the Parliament voted on a symbolic Testimony for National Cohesion in 2010. 
In the act, the Hungarian nation is represented as a congruent community unfairly split between 
several states by the will of foreign powers during the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. The depiction 
of the ‘national tragedy brought about by the enforced Peace Treaty of Trianon’ aims to provide 
ground to ‘Hungary’s commitment to support the natural claims for the maintenance and 
cultivation of relations between members and communities of the Hungarian nation and the 
promotion of various forms of collective autonomy based on accepted practices in Europe’ (Act 
No. 45 of 2010 on the Testimony for National Cohesion 2010. Emphasis mine). In a way, the 
Testimony for National Cohesion provides the representation of the nation needed to justify 
and legitimate Hungarian diaspora politics, notably the ‘autonomisation’ of the Hungarian 
diaspora from its home states, and the ensuing unification with the Hungarian nation. The Law 
39 
 
also proclaims the 4th of June – day of the Treaty of Trianon – a nation-wide ‘Day of National 
Cohesion’. 
Moreover, two other significant laws should be considered when analysing the legal 
construction of the Hungarian nation between 2010 and 2019. In 2010, Act LV of 1993 on 
Hungarian Citizenship was amended in order to allow Hungarian diaspora members 
preferential (accelerated) naturalisation. This amendment can be analysed as the eventual 
materialisation of the project developed by Fidesz in the 2004 referendum on non-resident 
citizenship. Preferential naturalisation can take place upon presentation of a clean criminal 
record, declaration of Hungarian origin, and proof of knowledge of the Hungarian language (J. 
Tóth 2010). As for the second criterion, the procedure is open to persons ‘whose ascendant was 
a Hungarian citizen’ or who has ‘been deprived of Hungarian citizenship’ (Act LV of 1993 on 
Hungarian Citizenship 2012). The amended Act on Citizenship therefore provides a 
preferential right to enter the Hungarian political community based on a sort of jus sanguinis, 
completed by a language criterion (although the law does not explicitly state what language 
level is demanded). In sum, the Act on Citizenship legitimates the inclusion of the Hungarian 
diaspora in the Hungarian political community. 
The draft law was submitted to the Parliament by Fidesz and received great political 
support—only eight MPs voted against or abstained, highlighting the willingness of political 
actors to take part in the redefinition of the Hungarian political community, perhaps in the 
hopes of seizing upon the possible dividends. As Pogonyi remarks, ‘the Socialists were also 
aware that by opposing the reform, they would have a harder time soliciting votes from the 
new transborder electorate if voting rights were offered at some point’ (Pogonyi 2017b, 87). 
The Act on Hungarian Citizenship could have remained a purely symbolic law, if it had 
not been completed by a reform of the electoral law a year after. In fact, amongst the 
modifications brought by the new Act on the Elections of Members of Parliament, non-resident 
citizens became entitled to vote for party lists and to be elected, possibly deciding for one or 
two seats (out of 199) (‘Act CCII of 2011 on the Election of Members of Parliament of Hungary 
as of 3 March 2014’ 2014). Political competition might have been the reason behind Fidesz’s 
decision to offer voting rights to the new Hungarian citizens: ‘[s]everal transborder political 
organizations also demanded voting rights for non-resident citizens. In addition, the radical 
right-wing party Jobbik stated that it would offer full citizenship, including voting and social 
rights for Hungarians living in the former Hungarian territories’ (Pogonyi 2017b, 95). 
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Concretely, the impact of the Act on Hungarian Citizenship and the Act on the Elections 
on national representations, and therefore practices, is likely to be significant. The two Acts 
literately legitimate the unification of the Hungarian diaspora with the Hungarian nation, 
insofar as the diaspora is represented as an integral part of the nation. Moreover, by offering 
voting rights to non-resident citizens, the Hungarian government opened the space to the 
development of new national practices. People who previously did not use to take part in the 
Hungarian political community may now regularly go out to put their ballots to elect their 
representatives in the Hungarian parliament. This may trigger a (re)new(ed) interest among the 
diaspora in Hungarian state politics, foster new information and media practices, as well as 
new representations of the self in the social world. The Act may reinforce the perception of 
oneself as belonging to the Hungarian nation and community. 
 
3.3 The Role of Institutions in Hungarian Diaspora Politics (2010–2019) 
The establishment of a new coalition as the head of the Hungarian government in 2010 
triggered the creation of a wide range of institutions interested in promoting and defending – 
in a word, representing - the interest of the Hungarian diaspora. As Pogonyi previously 
remarked, 2010 ‘marks an important turning point in Hungarian diaspora politics’ (Pogonyi 
2017b, 73). I want to go a step further and show that the period starting from 2010 can be 
analysed as a moment of institutionalisation17 of diaspora politics, providing the means to 
produce and reproduce representations of the diaspora. Accordingly, I will present thereafter 
the main institutions and organisations created in the framework of Hungarian diaspora politics 
between 2010 and 2019. A table summarising the developments mentioned will be found in 
table 1 at the end of this chapter. 
First, MÁÉRT was reconvened in 2010 after a six-year break, gathering representatives 
of the Hungarian government and other Hungarian parties, as well as representatives of 
diaspora parties and organisations. In the closing declaration on the tenth plenary session, 
MÁÉRT participants welcomed the reconvening of the platform for the launch of the co-
construction of the Hungarian nation (‘Closing Declaration of the Tenth Plenary Session of the 
Hungarian Standing Conference’ 2011). They also participated in the elaboration of a key 
document in recent Hungarian diaspora politics, the ‘Policy for Hungarian Communities 
 
17. Here, I will simply understand institutionalization as the creation of institutions and 
organisations.  
41 
 
Abroad: Strategic Framework for Hungarian Communities Abroad’ that provides the basis for 
the development of governmental diaspora politics (2013). 
In picture 1 below, it is possible to see a new representation of the Hungarian nation in 
the framework of MÁÉRT. Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán stands at the very centre 
of the assembly. On his left and right side, Zsolt Semjén and Árpád János Potápi, respectively 
Deputy Prime Minister for Nation Policy and State Secretary for Nation Policy. Around them 
stand representatives of the Hungarian diaspora. As Bourdieu remarks 
representative institutions (parliaments, general assemblies, councils, cones, etc.) no 
doubt underlie the most fundamental representations, mental or objective, of the nation 
and its structure. As a ceremonial which makes visible the ranks and numbers (and 
which can, for this reason, become a topic of discussion, as was the case with the 
opening of the General Assembly in France), the spatial projection realized by the two-
dimensional schema highlights the hierarchy of the groups represented (expressed by 
their ranking from the top down, or from right to left) and, in some cases. their 
numerical weight; and, more importantly, it highlights the very existence of the groups 
that arc represented and named … Representative assemblies are a kind of spatial 
projection of the political field and, through this, of the field of class relations of which 
the political scene is a theatricalized representation. In other words, the structure 
according to which these assemblies are organized and, in particular, the opposition 
between left and right- tends to impose itself as a paradigmatic manifestation of the 
social structure and to function in people's heads as a principle of di-vision of the social 
world and, in particular, of the division into classes (Bourdieu 1991c, 186. Emphases 
in the original). 
 
In fact, although MÁÉRT has participated in the elaboration of the governmental 
nemzetpolitika, it arguably remains under the authority of the government: MÁÉRT does not 
have a specific website or social media presence, nor does it release publications during the 
year. The platform has never taken the form of a formal organisation with an autonomous 
existence and remain in the position of consultative body subordinated to the Hungarian 
government.  
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Picture 1. The Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT) in 2019 
Source: nethuszar.ro 
 
In a similar position, the Hungarian Diaspora Council (Magyar Diaszpóra Tanács) a 
new meeting space, meant to gather diaspora representatives in the wider world, was created 
in 2011. The Hungarian Diaspora Council notably participated in the elaboration of a key 
document laying out the Hungarian government’s policy towards the Hungarian diaspora, 
represented as second- or third-generation Hungarians with an immigrant background 
(‘Hungarian Diaspora Policy: Strategic Directions’ 2016). In its founding declaration, the 
Hungarian Diaspora Council celebrates the year 2010, when ‘Hungarians displayed 
unprecedentedly widespread and strong solidarity’, demonstrating the subordination of the 
council to the newly elected government (‘The Founding Declaration of the Hungarian 
Diaspora Council’ 2011).  
Still in 2011, the Hungarian government and the American Senate established the Tom 
Lántos Institute (Tom Lántos Intézet-TLI), a non-governmental organisation defending, 
amongst other things, the rights of Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian Basin (‘About Us’ 
n.d.). TLI presents itself as an independent civil society organisation dealing with topics as 
diverse as ‘Human Rights and Identity’, ‘Jewish Life and Antisemitism’, ‘Roma Rights and 
Citizenship’, and ‘Hungarian Minorities’. In the latter category, TLI aims to increase capacity 
of civil society actors to defend the rights of the ‘Hungarian minority communities’—although 
the organisation’s website remains very evasive on the way this support is implemented. 
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The Bethlen Gábor Fund (Bethlen Gábor Alap pénzeszközeinek), founded in 2011, 
should also be mentioned as an important institution created within the framework of diaspora 
politics. It is  
állami pénzalap, amelynek célja a Magyar Kormány nemzetpolitikai stratégiájához 
kapcsolódó célok megvalósulásának elősegítése. Kiemelt feladata a külhoni magyarság 
szülőföldjén történő egyéni és közösségi boldogulásának, anyagi, szellemi 
gyarapodásának elősegítése és kultúrájának megőrzése érdekében támogatások 
nyújtása … A Kormány nemzetpolitikai stratégiájához igazodva meghívásos pályázati 
felhívásaival támogatja azon kiemelt nemzeti jelentőségű szervezeteket, intézményeket, 
illetve programokat, amelyek nagy hangsúlyt fektetnek a határon túli magyarság 
önazonosságának megőrzésére (a state fund aimed at promoting the objectives of the 
Hungarian Government's nation policy strategy. Its main task is to promote individual 
and community prosperity, material and intellectual growth in the homeland of 
Hungarians abroad and to provide support for the preservation of their culture … In line 
with the government's national policy strategy, it supports, through invitations to tender, 
organizations, institutions and programs of outstanding national importance, which 
place great emphasis on preserving the identity of the Hungarians beyond the borders) 
(‘Magunkról (About Us)’ n.d.). 
 
In a word, the Bethlen Gábor Fund is the institution financing and implementing governmental 
diaspora politics.  
Amongst the institutions funded by the Bethlen Gábor Fund stands the House of 
Hungarians (Magyarszág Háza), a cultural institution which ‘a minden magyar összetartozását 
jelképező’ (‘symbolises the unity of all Hungarians’) (‘Magyarság Háza (House of Hungarians)’ 
n.d.). The House of Hungarians hosts cultural and educational events (exhibitions, theatre plays, 
concerts, literary presentations, etc.) that ‘bemutatják a világ magyarságára jellemző értékeket, 
eredményeket, teljesítményeket, sikereket’ (‘present the typical values, achievements, 
performances and successes of the Hungarians of the world’) (‘Magyarság Háza’ n.d.). For 
instance, it organises presentations on books written by Hungarian-language authors from 
Romania, and showcases theatre companies from Slovakia. Overall, the House of Hungarians 
aims to channel artists and creators from the Hungarian diaspora into the Hungarian artistic 
scene. 
Moreover, the Bethlen Gábor Fund established the Research Institute for Hungarian 
Communities Abroad (Nemzetpolitikai Kutatóintézet-NPKI), tasked with the production and 
diffusion of knowledge relative to the Hungarian diaspora, in 2011. According to its website, 
NPKI's activities can be divided into three areas: knowledge production (research, analysis, 
background material), knowledge presentation (publications, events), and knowledge transfer 
(education). In a nutshell, NPKI publishes academic journals, books, demographic and policy 
44 
 
analyses, media reviews; organises conferences and events; has its own internship programme; 
and provides training to Hungarian state civil servants, professionals and students. It is 
important to note that some, if not most, of these activities have a Hungarian- and English-
language version, and therefore also address the international community. 
 Besides, the Fund also supports the Institute for the Protection of Minority Rights 
(Kisebbségi Jogvédő Alapítvány – KJI), an NGO advocating for the rights of the Hungarian 
diaspora living in the Carpathian Basin since 2012. KJI supports lawsuits advocating for 
diaspora members’ rights on national and international levels, holds a legal permanence in 
Hungary’s neighbouring countries, and organises events (trainings, conferences, summer 
universities) to raise awareness to and promote minority rights advocacy. 
At the level of governmental structure, a State Secretariat for Hungarian Communities 
Abroad (Ministry of Public Administration and Justice, and soon Prime Minister’s Office) was 
established to produce and coordinate policy related to the Hungarian diaspora (Kántor 2014). 
In the Parliament, a Committee on National Cohesion (Nemzeti Összetartozás Bizottsága) was 
specifically created to discuss issues related to the Hungarian diaspora. Since the last elections 
in 2018, it includes nine members of parliament, amongst whom six Fidesz and KDNP MPs 
(‘Nemzeti Összetartozás Bizottsága’ n.d.). 
Institutions were also established by non-political actors. For instance, the Friends of 
Hungary Foundation (Magyarország Barátai Alapítvány) was created in 2011 by public figures 
(such as bankers, professors, journalists, artists) coming from Hungary and beyond. The 
foundation ‘collects and disseminates information about the social, cultural, economic and 
scientific activities of Hungarians, strengthening the ties between Hungarians living in their 
homeland and in the Diaspora’, in the form of media outlets in English and German  (‘About 
Us’ n.d.), privileged channels for Hungarian national representations to non-Hungarian-
speaking audiences. Moreover, the Friends of Hungary Foundation recently launched the ‘I 
Dance Hungary’ website,18 to attract foreigners, possibly with Hungarian heritage, to get to 
know more about the Hungarian Dance House Movement. It is finally possible to identify 
foundations and organisations specifically focusing on the Hungarian diaspora in the United 
States, such as the Magyar Foundation of North America created in 2014, which is very active 
in promoting Hungary on social media. It is also worth mentioning the Hungarian Human 
 
18. See https://idancehungary.hu/.   
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Rights Foundation that, while it was established in 1976, is partly behind the birth right travel 
programmes developed since 2012.  
Since 2010, the Hungarian diaspora political field has therefore been compounded by 
actors coming from different states and different fields. On the one hand, whilst most of the 
institutions created since 2010 are based in Hungary, it is also possible to identify numerous 
institutions set up from abroad or employing staff coming from states other than Hungary. For 
instance, 7 researchers out of 9 in NPKI were not born and educated in Hungary, but in 
neighbouring countries (Ukraine, Slovakia, and Romania) ((‘Munkatársak (Staff)’ n.d.). 
Additionally, actors involved in diaspora politics come from different backgrounds. An 
important part of the diaspora political field is unsurprisingly occupied by political actors 
(MÁÉRT, Hungarian Diaspora Council). However, it is also possible to see that actors 
originally belonging to the scientific field (NPKI), cultural field (House of the Hungarians, 
Friends of Hungary Foundation), legal field (Tom Lántos Institute, Institute for the Protection 
of Minority Rights) have engaged in the discussion surrounding the Hungarian nation. 
However, the Hungarian diaspora political field remains largely dominated by the 
Hungarian government, which contributed to the establishment of most of the institutions 
mentioned above. This domination reflects Fidesz-KDNP’s domination of the broader political 
field, materialised in control over the Hungarian parliament: in 2010, Fidesz-KNDP gathered 
almost 68% of the seats in the Parliament. For comparison, in the previous parliamentary term 
(2006-2010), Fidesz-KDNP held 42% of the seats, against 48% for the governmental coalition. 
This dependence of the diaspora political field on the Fidesz-KDNP government raises the 
question of its autonomy. On the one hand, it may be suggested that the diaspora political field 
has gained independence from the larger political field since 2010, because it is structured by 
institutions that, in Bourdieu’s wording, are vitally, and only, interested in representing the 
Hungarian diaspora. These institutions are arguably engaged in a struggle over the 
representation of the diaspora and might be completely unrelated to other aspects of Hungarian 
politics. On the other hand, most of these institutions are still largely reliant on governmental 
funding and capacity and may therefore be very dependent on changes taking place in the 
broader Hungarian political field. 
The role of institutions in the diaspora political field is significant in shaping new 
practices and representations of the Hungarian nation. In fact, all these institutions seek to 
represent the Hungarian diaspora, and are therefore engaged in the production and reproduction 
of diaspora representations. In the present case, these representations tend to include the 
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diaspora into the wider concept of Hungarian nation. For instance, the Hungarian Diaspora 
Council launched the Julianus Programme in 2012 ‘with the purpose of creating a 
comprehensive register of the Hungarian material heritage – buildings, works of art, 
monuments, memorial plaques, streets, libraries, archives, museums etc. – in order to promote 
the wide-spread familiarization of the Hungarian culture’ (‘Julianus Program’ n.d.). On the 
Hungarian Register website, it is possible to download a registration form to report the 
existence of objects represented as Hungarian heritage, and to send it back to the programme's 
administrators along with pictures or videos. The aim is to produce an overview of material 
heritage which ‘demonstrate[s] the presence of Hungarians’ (‘Julianus Program’ n.d. Emphasis 
mine.) abroad, in the form of an interactive online map available on the webpage (see picture 
2 below). The map displays a multitude of colourful points all around the world, where the user 
can see a materialisation of a world Hungarian nation.  
 
Picture 2. The map constituted with the data collected in the Julianus Programme (2020) 
Source: nemzetiregiszter.hu 
 
Moreover, the Hungarian Diaspora Council launched the Mikes Kelemen Programme 
in 2013, allowing Hungarian diaspora organisations overseas to send Hungarian material 
heritage to Hungary in order to preserve it. According to the National Register website, ‘a huge 
amount of material equal to 100,000 volumes of books has been collected. The composition of 
the collected material heritage is also promising. Beside periodicals, printouts, invitations and 
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posters about the life of diaspora Hungarians and their communities, picture- and audio-
recordings have also been offered’ (‘Mikes Kelemen Program’ n.d.). The collection should later 
be presented in a new Hungarian Emigration and Diaspora Centre, permitting the production 
of a renewed national memory. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Picture 3. An article on Külhoni Magyarok titled ‘From festive preparation to Christmas at 
Herman’s family’s’ (2019) 
Source: kulhonimagyarok.hu 
 
Finally, the role of media, and particularly online and social media, in channelling 
representations should be highlighted. In 2011, the Hungarian government launched the 
Hungarian Register (Nemzeti Regiszter) website, with the aim of providing a platform of 
information to the Hungarian diaspora. On the website, it is possible to find news on diaspora 
and diaspora politics, on Hungarian consulates abroad, events and pictures organised by 
diaspora organisations, presentations of diaspora organisations, as well as key documents in 
recent Hungarian diaspora politics, such as the laws and documents mentioned above. 
Furthermore, the Friends of Hungary Foundation launched in 2016 a new media website, 
Hungary Today, where news articles on politics, society, economy, culture and sport are 
published daily in English. The website is also available in German under the name Ungarn 
Heute. More recently, the government developed another online initiative, named Hungarians 
Abroad (Külhoni Magyarok). On this website, the user can find news about the Hungarian 
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diaspora: the ‘faces from the Carpathian Basin’ section allows the user to scroll between 
different portraits of individuals of families, representing the diversity of the Hungarian 
diaspora in the Carpathian Basin (see picture 3 above). In the articles, a reporter presents a 
first-person account of the daily life of ‘normal people’, along with pictures of their home, 
activities, and families, facilitating the identification between the readers (Hungarian-speakers) 
and the diaspora represented (‘Kárpát-Medence Arcai (Faces from the Carpathian Basin)’ n.d.). 
Moreover, the institutions of the diaspora political field seek to alter not only national 
representations but also national practices. For instance, the Hungarian Government and 
Bethlen Gábor Fund jointly launched a programme named Without Borders! in 2010. The 
programme aims at bringing Hungarian high school students to ‘meet’ the Hungarian nation 
beyond the borders. Pap, who wrote a thesis on this specific programme, remarks that it has 
an explicitly nation-building aim. It was envisaged by governmental elites as a means 
of political socialization, one that attempts to inculcate certain notions of 
Hungarianness in the targeted pupils; in other words, it seeks to make them national. 
Határtalanul [name of the programme in Hungarian] can easily be placed within a long 
chain of transborder nation-building policies which have been implemented by 
consecutive Hungarian governments during the last two and a half decades. These 
policies have functioned to institutionalize of a Hungarian nation which transcends the 
borders of Hungary and includes all the ethnic Hungarian communities living in the 
territories of the former Greater Hungary (Pap 2013, 1-2). 
 
The Without Borders! programme explicitly seeks to alter national representations by altering 
national practices, insofar as it allows Hungarian students to practically and physically meet 
other youngster presented as their ‘co-nationals’. 
 On a similar note, the Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Program has been run by the Hungarian 
government since 2012. The programme allows young Hungarians to become interns in 
Hungarian cultural organisations mostly in Western countries (Europe, North America, South 
America, Australia) (‘Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Program’ n.d.). The internship is built on a ‘win-
win’ principle: Hungarian interns can travel to foreign countries and gain international 
experience, while they are expected to bring their knowledge and practice of what it is to be 
Hungarian to diaspora organisations, and thereby contribute to reinforcing a feeling of 
solidarity and identity between the ‘core nation’ and the diaspora. 
Multiple other programmes have been developed and function on similar principles. 
Four birthright programmes ReConnect Hungary, a joint initiative of the Hungarian 
government the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation and other North American diaspora 
organisations, have allowed young citizens of North America with Hungarian heritage to take 
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a trip to Hungary or Transylvania since 2012, in order to ‘strengthen their personal Hungarian 
identity through connection to the country, culture and heritage’ (‘About the Program’ n.d.). 
Moreover, the Petőfi Sándor Programme launched in 2015 sends Hungarian interns to 
Hungarian cultural organisations, this time in the Carpathian Basin (‘Petőfi Sándor Program’ 
n.d.). 
In that regard, the role of youth exchange programmes, whereby youngsters can 
experience the nation, might be determinant to transform practical representations of what it is 
to be Hungarian. The youth is arguably a privileged target to reproduce representations because 
young consumers have none or little capital in the field, and therefore are particularly reliant 
on the institutions to accumulate it. Thus, they are likely to incorporate and reproduce national 
representations. As Bourdieu explains, ‘[t]he law which governs the exchanges between agents 
and institutions can be expressed in this way: the institution gives everything, starting with 
power over the institution, to those who have given everything to the institution. but this is 
because they were nothing outside the institution or without the institution and because they 
cannot deny the institution without purely and simply denying themselves by depriving 
themselves of everything that they have become through and for the institution to which they 
owe everything’ (Bourdieu 1991c, 195). 
 
3.4 Appendix: Hungarian Diaspora Politics (2010–2019) 
Date Type Name Initiator 
1976 Institution Hungarian Human Rights Foundation 19 Hungarians in the U.S. 
 
2010 Institution State Secretariat for Hungarian 
Communities Abroad 
(Miniszterelnökség nemzetpolitikai 
államtitkárság) 
Hungarian Government 
2010 Institution Hungarian Standing Conference 
(Magyar Állandó Értekezlet - MÁÉRT) 
Hungarian Government 
 
19. See http://hhrf.org.  
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2010 Law Amendment to the Act LV of 1993 on 
Hungarian Citizenship (1993. évi LV. 
törvénya magyar állampolgárságról) 
 
Fidesz/KDNP in the 
Parliament 
2010 Law Act No. 45 of 2010 on the Testimony for 
National Cohesion (2010. évi XLV. 
törvény a Nemzeti Összetartozás 
melletti tanúságtételről) 
 
Fidesz/KDNP in the 
Parliament 
2010 Programme Without Borders! Programme 
(Határtalanul! Program)20 
Hungarian 
Government/Bethlen 
Gábor Fund 
2011 Institution Tom Lántos Institute (Tom Lántos 
Intézet)21 
Hungarian 
Government/U.S. Senate 
2011 Institution Hungarian Diaspora Council (Magyar 
Diaszpóra Tanács) 
 
Hungarian Government 
2011 Institution Bethlen Gábor Fund (Bethlen Gábor 
Alap pénzeszközeinek)22 
 
Hungarian Government 
2011 Institution Friends of Hungary Foundation 
(Magyarország Barátai Alapítvány)23 
 
Public figures abroad 
2011 Institution House of Hungarians (Magyarszág 
Háza)24 
 
Hungarian 
Government/Bethlen 
Gábor Fund 
 
20. See https://hatartalanul.net/ (in Hungarian only).  
 
21. See https://tomlantosinstitute.hu/en/. 
 
22. See https://bgazrt.hu/ (in Hungarian only). 
 
23. See https://friendsofhungary.hu/rolunk-en. 
 
24. See https://magyarsaghaza.net/ (in Hungarian only). 
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2011 Institution Research Institute For Hungarian 
Communities Abroad (Nemzetpolitikai 
Kutatóintézet - NPKI)25 
Hungarian 
Government/Bethlen 
Gábor Fund 
2011 Institution Parliamentary Committee on National 
Cohesion (Nemzeti Összetartozás 
Bizottsága)26 
Fidesz/KDNP in the 
Parliament 
2011 Law The Fundamental Law of Hungary 
(Magyarország Alaptörvénye) 
Fidesz/KDNP in the 
Parliament 
2011 Law Act CCIII of 2011 on the Elections of 
Members of Parliament (2011. évi 
CCIII. törvény az országgyűlési 
képviselők választásáról) 
Fidesz/KDNP in the 
Parliament 
2011 Media Hungarian Register (Nemzeti 
Regiszter)27 
Hungarian Government 
2012 Institution Institute for the Protection of Minority 
Rights (Kisebbségi Jogvédő 
Alapítvány)28 
Hungarian 
Government/Bethlen 
Gábor Fund 
2012 Media Kisebbségkutatás NPKI/Lucidus Kiadó  
2012 Programme Julianus Programme29 Hungarian Diaspora 
Council 
2012 Programme Kőrösi Csoma Sándor Programme30 Hungarian Government 
 
 
25. See https://bgazrt.hu/nemzetpolitikai-kutatointezet/ (in Hungarian only). 
 
26. See https://www.parlament.hu/web/nemzeti-osszetartozas-bizottsaga (in Hungarian only). 
 
27. See https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/main-page.  
 
28. See https://www.en.kji.hu/.  
 
29. See https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/julianus-program-en.  
 
30. See https://www.korosiprogram.hu/ (in Hungarian only).  
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2012 Programme ReConnect Hungary - Hungarian 
Birthright Trip31 
Hungarian Human 
Rights 
Foundation/Hungarian 
Government/other 
organisations 
2012 Programme ReConnect Hungary 29+32 Hungarian Human 
Rights 
Foundation/Hungarian 
Government/other 
organisations 
2012 Programme Year of Hungarian kindergarten 
students abroad (Külhoni magyar 
óvodások) 
Hungarian Government 
2013 Document ‘Policy for Hungarian Communities 
Abroad: Strategic Framework for 
Hungarian Communities Abroad’ 
Hungarian Government/ 
MÁÉRT 
2013 Media Minority Studies NPKI/Lucidus Kiadó  
2013 Programme Mikes Kelemen Programme33 Hungarian Diaspora 
Council 
2013 Programme Year of Hungarian primary school 
students abroad (Külhoni magyar 
kisiskolások) 
Hungarian Government 
2014 Institution Magyar Foundation of North America34 Unknown 
2014 Programme Year of Hungarian high school students 
abroad (Külhoni magyar felsősök) 
Hungarian Government 
 
31 . See https://reconnecthungary.org/the-programs/reconnect-hungary-hungarian-birthright-
trip.  
 
32. See https://reconnecthungary.org/the-programs/119-reconnect-hungary.  
 
33. See https://www.nemzetiregiszter.hu/mikes-kelemen-program-en.  
 
34. See http://magyarfoundation.com/. 
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2015 Programme Petőfi Sándor Programme35 Hungarian Government 
2015 Programme Twinning Programme 
(Testvértelepülési program) 
Bethlen Gábor Fund 
2015 Programme Year of Hungarian Vocational Training 
Abroad (Külhoni magyar szakképzés) 
Hungarian Government 
2016 Document ‘Hungarian Diaspora Policy: Strategic 
Directions’ 
Hungarian 
Government/Hungarian 
Diaspora Council 
2016 Media Hungary Today36 Friends of Hungary 
Foundation 
2016 Programme Year of Hungarian Young 
Entrepreneurs Abroad (Külhoni magyar 
fiatal vállalkozók) 
Hungarian Government 
2016 Programme Diaspora Programme Rákóczi 
Association/Hungarian 
Government 
2017 Media Ungarn Heute37 Friends of Hungary 
Foundation 
2017 Media Hungarian Journal of Minority Studies NPKI/Lucidus Kiadó  
2017 Media Kisebbségi Szemle NPKI/Lucidus Kiadó  
2017 Programme Year of Hungarian Family Business 
Abroad (Külhoni magyar családi 
vállalkozások)38 
Hungarian Government 
2018 Programme ReConnect Transylvania39 Hungarian Human 
Rights 
 
35. See https://www.petofiprogram.hu/ (in Hungarian only). 
 
36. See https://hungarytoday.hu/.  
 
37. See https://ungarnheute.hu/ (in German only).  
 
38. See https://vallalkozokeve.kormany.hu/ (in Hungarian only). 
 
39. See https://reconnecthungary.org/the-programs/reconnect-transylvania.  
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Foundation/Hungarian 
Government/other 
organisations 
2018 Programme ReConnect Transylvania+40 Hungarian Human 
Rights 
Foundation/Hungarian 
Government/other 
organisations 
2018 Programme Year of Hungarian families abroad 
(Külhoni magyar családok)41 
Hungarian Government 
2019 Media Hungarians Abroad (Külhoni 
Magyarok)42 
 
Hungarian Government 
2019 Programme Year of Hungarian Children Abroad 
(Külhoni magyar gyerekek) 
Hungarian Government 
Planned Institution Hungarian Emigration and Diaspora 
Centre 
Hungarian Government 
Table 1. Major laws, documents, institutions, programmes, media forming Hungarian diaspora 
politics between 2010 and 2019 
Source: Original table 
 
⁂ 
 
In the chapter, I examined how the development of a legal and institutional framework for 
Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 has enabled the production and 
reproduction of new national representations. The structuring of the Hungarian diaspora 
political field arguably started with the Hungarian regime change in the early nineties. The 
successive governments elected after the fall of the communist regime all engaged, to different 
extents, in a form of diaspora politics and fostered the creation of the first institutions and laws 
acknowledging and representing the Hungarian diaspora. However, the frequent political 
 
40. See https://reconnecthungary.org/the-programs/reconnect-transylvania-plus.  
 
41. See https://kulhonicsaladokeve.kormany.hu/ (in Hungarian only).  
 
42. See http://www.kulhonimagyarok.hu/ (in Hungarian only).  
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alternation did not permit the establishment of a stable legal and institutional framework for 
diaspora politics. Therefore, the establishment of a new government in 2010 marked a new 
period in the development of Hungarian diaspora politics. The Fidesz-KDNP coalition at the 
head of the government restructured the Hungarian diaspora political field through the 
definition of a new legal and institutional framework. On the one hand, the government sought 
to legitimate the representation of a unified Hungarian nation in different laws, including the 
new constitution of the Hungarian state. On the other hand, it established numerous institutions 
to represent the diaspora, fostering the production and reproduction of the integration of the 
diaspora in the national community. 
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Chapter 4. Visions and Divisions of the Hungarian National World in Minority Studies 
(2013–2016) 
In this fourth chapter, I will inquire how visions and divisions of the national world are 
represented and legitimated by actors engaged in the diaspora political field, based on a case 
study of Minority Studies, a journal edited by NPKI between 2013 and 2016. I will argue that 
diaspora political actors have integrated the diaspora into the Hungarian national world through 
the representation of three key principles of di/vision of the national world: historical, cultural, 
and political. In turn, these principles of division legitimate the production of a great, unified 
and united Hungarian nation. 
First, I will show that the Hungarian national world is represented as historically 
divided by the Treaty of Trianon. This division, described as traumatic and unfair, posits an 
identity between the contemporary Hungarian state and the Hungarian diaspora. On these 
grounds, it legitimates the re-integration of the diaspora in the Hungarian national community. 
Second, I will explore the principles of divisions between the diaspora and its ‘others’. The 
diaspora is represented as culturally distinct from the remaining population of the states it lives 
in. As articles represent threats to the maintenance of this cultural divide, they provide 
arguments to produce and reproduce the inclusion of the diaspora in the Hungarian world. 
Finally, political divisions in the diaspora are also represented, and provide the grounds for a 
unified political representation. 
 
4.1 Historical Divisions 
Crucially for the topic of diaspora politics, the first division that can be identified in Minority 
Studies is structured on a historical principle of division. A foundational myth par excellence, 
the Treaty of Trianon is represented as the key event that led to the division of the Hungarian 
nation between the Hungarian national core and the Hungarian diaspora. 9 articles of the 
Hungaro-centred sample mention the Treaty of Trianon in one way or another. 
The same stereotypical sentence quantifying the extent of the loss (proportion of 
territory or population) re-appears throughout the texts, testifying of the reproduction of this 
specific representation. While an author explains that ‘[a]fter World War I Hungary has lost 
two-thirds of its territory, one third of the Hungarian speaking population, most of its natural 
wealth of minerals, forests and its railway system was also disrupted; moreover, Hungary’s 
remaining territory had to take care of 430 thousand displaced persons as well’ (Szűts 2013, 
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231), another confirms that ‘[the First World War] was followed by the humiliation of the 
imposed Peace Treaty of Trianon (1920) which led to the loss of three-fourths of their territory 
and two-thirds of their population, including one-fourth of the ethnic Hungarian population of 
the Carpathian Basin’ (Ludányi 2014, 68), and a third expounds that ‘Hungary is one of those 
countries which, as a result of the 20th century border changes, have lost a significant proportion 
of their territory and population, and consequently, substantial Hungarian communities have 
lived in the neighbouring countries (in Romania: more than 1.2 million, in Slovakia: 450 000, 
in Serbia: 250 000, in the Ukraine: 150 000) for more than 90 years now (Illyés and Rákóczi 
2014, 9). 
 The division between the Hungarian state and the diaspora is depicted as profoundly 
unfair, arbitrary, and violent. Following interviews with present-day diaspora members, an 
article remarks for instance that ‘the feeling of “homelessness” was mentioned in all of the 
Hungarian focus-groups in Slovakia, pointing out that the minority identity structures are 
closely connected with feelings of insecurity – these Hungarian communities are involuntary 
communities that came into being as a result of a political decision, the Trianon Treaty’ (Danero 
Iglesias, Sata, and Vass 2016, 22). In the same article, the hardship encountered by diaspora 
members is depicted: ‘It is not only multiple languages that minority members need to master 
but their self-identification is made harder by the fact that the borders of the homeland (the 
motherland) and the borders of the state in which they live are not the same’ (Danero Iglesias, 
Sata, and Vass 2016, 22), leading the authors to argue that ‘[t]here is a deep structural division, 
an invisible mental barrier: belonging to the Hungarian nation is natural for those who are 
living in Hungary, but for Hungarians living in neighbouring countries, it is an emotionally, 
culturally determined question, which influences their everyday lives and practices’ (Danero 
Iglesias, Sata, and Vass 2016, 24). 
The traumatic experience of Trianon for the members of the diaspora is also illustrated 
hereafter: ‘when the new boundaries of Hungary were drawn by the Treaty of Trianon (1920), 
some three-and-a-half million Hungarians found themselves attached to another country, 
against their will’ (Schöpflin 2016, 11). Meanwhile, another piece points to the absurdity of the 
redefined borders following the First World War: 'Peace treaties established new states and 
borderlines on the territory of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, ostensible using 
national self-determination as the main organizing principle. However, so many different- 
economic, strategic or purely territorial considerations were added, that the new configuration 
58 
 
of states in the given region did not follow the national-ethnic principle even where ethnical-
demographical conditions would have made it possible' (Csernicskó and Fedinec 2016, 94).  
 Following the opposition between Hungary and the diaspora, Hungary is represented 
as the national core, the ‘homeland’ (Herner-Kovács and Kántor 2014; Danero Iglesias, Sata, 
and Vass 2016; Kiss 2016; Gazsó 2016), the ‘motherland’ (Kántor 2014) of the Hungarian 
nation, while the diaspora is at the periphery, inhabiting ‘host-states’ (Danero Iglesias, Sata, 
and Vass 2016) or ‘host countries’ (Kiss and Barna 2013; Gazsó 2016; Márton 2014).43 
Here, it is possible to analyse the role of historical representations in diaspora politics. 
In Minority Studies, the contemporary Hungarian nation is represented as the direct heir of the 
1920 population divided by the Treaty of Trianon. This representation implies a historical 
continuity between the population of pre-World War I Kingdom of Hungary, and the 
contemporary populations split between several states. In other words, it assumes a conceptual 
identity between ‘Hungarians’ within and without the Hungarian state, and creates a link 
between past and present, upon which the Hungarian nemzetpolitika grounds its symbolic 
power. Thus, the representation of the Treaty of Trianon acts as a powerful legitimation of 
contemporary diaspora politics: if the nation was unfairly divided a hundred years ago, it is 
legitimate (that is fair, lawful) that the present government repairs the broken relations between 
the members of the Hungarian nation. Moreover, if Hungary is the diaspora’s motherland, it 
implies a moral duty to protect, represent and ‘welcome back’ the diaspora in its historical 
home - the Hungarian national world. 
In sum, Minority Studies produces and reproduces to a large extent the representation 
of a Hungarian nation divided by the turmoil of the First World War. This representation 
‘surreptitiously posits the existence of the group in question’ (Bourdieu, 1991d, 250) – the 
Hungarian nation, and integrate the diaspora in its definition. 
 
 
43. Although this representation is not entirely consensual: ‘I used inverted commas for the 
designations “host” and “homeland,” because they misrepresent the situation of the actors 
involved. Individuals belonging to national minorities cannot be “hosted” by the states in which 
they were born, and which they recognize as their historical native land. They are not guests in 
their origin country, even less so in their state of birth-right citizenship. Similarly, the ethnic 
kin-state abroad is not their “homeland” until they move their residence there and start to feel 
“at home”’ (Culic 2014, 137). 
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4.2 Cultural Divisions 
Furthermore, Minority Studies produce and reproduce cultural principles of division between 
the diaspora and its ‘others’. First, the diaspora is distinguished from the ‘titular majority’ of 
the states it lives in according to a linguistic principle. Articles, particularly those concerned 
with Hungarian-language education, define the Hungarian diaspora by the practice of the 
Hungarian language, as opposed to the Serb, Ukrainian, Slovak, or Romanian languages. For 
instance, in an article analysing the result of the 2011 census in Hungary, the Hungarianness is 
‘operationalized in the narrow concepts of mother tongue and language use’ (Morauszki and 
Papp Z. 2016, 158). Another author clarifies: ‘[i]n formal contexts, the Hungarian community 
is delimited most frequently according to self-identification. But in everyday situations 
language knowledge and language use are at least equally important. Those who do not possess 
the proper linguistic abilities fail to be recognized by other Hungarians as members of the 
Hungarian community’ (Kiss 2016, 42). 
However, the linguistic division is abandoned as soon as the ‘Roma’ category is 
mobilised in an article, and replaced with a principle of division articulated as ethnic or cultural. 
Almost half of the Hungaro-centred articles mention the Roma, highlighting the role of this 
‘Other’ in defining what are (not) Hungarians. Because Roma people may be of Hungarian 
mother-tongue, authors are inclined to find strategies to maintain the division between these 
‘non-Hungarian Hungarian-speakers’ and the ‘Hungarian Hungarian-speakers’. For instance, 
authors often refer to ‘Hungarian mother-tongue Romas’ (Papp Z. 2013), ‘Hungarian-speaking 
Roma’ (Kiss and Barna 2013), ‘Hungarian Roma’, or ‘Roma–Hungarian’ (Kiss and Barna 
2013), in order to distinguish them from simple ‘Hungarians’. Here, an author testifies to his 
unease with integra Roma into his representations of Hungarianness: ‘[t]he majority of Roma 
living in Székelyland identifies itself with the Hungarian category in official situations (census, 
elections, educational enrolment etc.) but in everyday life there is a huge social distance 
between the Roma and the non-Roma’ (Kiss 2016, 39-40). This first statement is somehow 
contradicted a bit later, showing the author's hesitation about where to put the line between 
Hungarians and Roma: ‘however, Hungarian speaking Roma can be categorized as 
Hungarians’ (Kiss 2016, 42). 
The division between Hungarians and Romas is represented as founded on cultural 
differences leading to conflict. As an example, an author explains that ‘the school cannot 
handle the common problems of the 2 schools due to the deepening social and cultural 
differences and the frequent local conflicts [between the local Hungarian and Roma 
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communities]’ (Morvai and Szarka 2013, 132). The most paradigmatic case of such 
representation might be found in an article exploring ‘how and to what extent does the local 
proportion of a minority population, which became the target of xenophobic sentiments – and 
which are referred to hereinafter as enemy group or primary enemy group –, influence the local 
support for xenophobic nationalism’ (Harrach 2016, 184). The author argues that (anti-Roma) 
xenophobic nationalism of Hungarians is ‘an outcome of the direct and indirect experiences 
in/about ethnic conflict zones’ caused by ‘socio-cultural dividing lines’ (Harrach 2016, 195-
196) and ‘cultural or civilizational differences’ (Harrach 2016, 195-196). 
Furthermore, the cultural distinction between the Hungarian diaspora and the rest of the 
population is may be indirectly represented as a positive division, that needs to be reproduced. 
Accordingly, several articles contemplate the importance of the reproduction of the Hungarian 
culture for the reproduction of the Hungarian diaspora. For instance, an article explains that 
‘[i]n the case of a minority group, generational reproduction is not only a matter of fertility 
rates. It is also an important question, weather [sic] or not and to what extent are the parents 
are able (and disposed) to transmit their ethno-cultural skills and identity to their offspring’ 
(Kiss and Barna 2013, 39), and another assents that the ‘Hungarian language education is also 
of primary importance from the perspective of the ethno-cultural reproduction of the 
community’ (Kiss 2016, 46). 
Nevertheless, most of the articles rather represent the erosion of this distinction as a 
negative trend, that needs to be countered. As such, Minority Studies produces and reproduces 
the representation of existential threat for the diaspora. As a matter of fact, the number of 
Hungarian diaspora members is systematically represented as shrinking. In Slovakia, 
‘[b]etween 1921-1950, the number of Hungarians dropped ... From 1950 to 1991, the growth 
rate of the Hungarian population declined with every decade ... The third phase of the 
demographic evolution of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia started in the 1990s, and it has been 
marked by a considerable shrinkage of the Hungarian population’ (Gyurgyík 2013, 54-55). In 
Romania as well, ‘[t]he Hungarian community of Transylvania has been characterized by an 
accelerated population loss following the collapse of the state socialist regime. The number of 
Hungarians decreased by almost 350 thousand (21 percent) in the time period between 1992 
and 2011’ (Kiss 2016, 36), and ‘[t]he ratio of people of Hungarian ethnicity in Subcarpathia 
has shown a downward trend in recent years’ (Ferenc 2013, 165). As for Serbia, an author 
explains the declining number of votes for Hungarian ethnic parties partly as the result of ‘the 
continuous decrease of the Hungarian population in Vojvodina’ (Herner-Kovács 2013a, 95). 
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This decline may also be symbolically represented through the production of maps (see 
for example Kiss 2016; Kiss and Barna 2013; Morvai and Szarka 2013). These maps allow the 
reader to identify the limits and vanishing of the Hungarian national world and may be coloured 
in a way to guide the interpretation. For instance, a map representing Transylvania displays the 
towns with a ‘numerical increase’ in green, and a ‘drastic decline’ in red (see picture 4 below).  
Picture 4. A map displaying the demographic evolutions of the Hungarian diaspora in Romania 
Source: Kiss and Barna (2013, 33) 
 
 Moreover, articles produce and reproduce the same interpretations of the existential 
threat faced by the Hungarian diaspora, namely emigration, negative birth rate, and assimilation: 
‘[t]he population loss was caused by several factors. In order of their importance these factors 
are the following: emigration, negative natural growth, and assimilatory processes’ (Kiss 2016, 
36); ‘[t]he ratio of people of Hungarian ethnicity in Subcarpathia has shown a downward trend 
in recent years, the main reasons of which are assimilation, low birth rate, and migration’ 
(Ferenc 2013, 165); ‘we shall look at the factors determining the reduction of the Hungarian 
population: decrease replacing natural increase, Hungarian-Slovak assimilation trends and 
(hidden) migration’ (Gyurgyík 2013, 55). 
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 Assimilation is the most successful representation of the risk incurred by the erosion of 
the Hungarian cultural divisions, as 15 articles mention it and elaborate on the issue. 
Assimilation may be caused by the non-reproduction of linguistic divisions: ‘opting for non-
mother tongue educational institution leads to the 'self-extermination' and assimilation of the 
minority’ (Papp Z 2013, 104), and ‘education in the majority’s language leads to assimilation’ 
(Morvai and Szarka 2013, 123). It may also occur as a result of the erosion of socio-cultural 
divisions: ‘... this problem [intergenerational assimilation] arises quite acutely in interethnic 
marriages because most of the children growing up in mixed families shift toward the majority 
identity, group, and culture’ (Kiss and Barna 2013, 39); ‘the majority of those participating in 
state-language education were born to interethnic marriages’ (Papp Z. 2014, 92); ‘... at one of 
the research locations, it turned out that opting for non-mother-tongue education was decided 
by the existence of an ethnically mixed circle of friends’ (Papp Z. 2013, 120); ‘the weakest 
performance in reading comprehension was produced by those Hungarians who live in 
ethnically mixed environment’ (Ferenc 2016, 123). 
From a socio-political perspective, the fear of assimilation represented above can be 
understood in the framework of struggles for the di/vision of the social world. Assimilation is 
not, on the contrary of emigration or birth rate, a mere question of number. Rather, it is a 
question of identification, affiliation: the people being ‘assimilated’ do not physically disappear 
but change their patterns of identification. The assimilation of the Hungarian diaspora, that is, 
the border changes in national identification, is a direct threat to the interests of those vitally 
attached to the existence of a Hungarian diaspora – diaspora representatives. In other words, 
assimilation may be perceived as a key issue because it implies the victory of a competing 
representation of the social world on individual’s self-understanding. If ‘Hungarians’ become 
‘Romanians’, it follows that representations produced by competing ‘foreign’ actors became 
stronger than the ones produced by ‘Hungarian’ actors. 
Thus, the diaspora is integrated in the Hungarian national world through cultural 
principles of division (linguistic, ethno-cultural) that produce and reproduce divisions between 
the diaspora community and its ‘others’. Moreover, representing the – negative - consequences 
of assimilation for the diaspora provides an incentive to support calls for cultural reproduction 
of the division between the diaspora and its ‘host-state’, notably through education in 
Hungarian and endogamy in the diaspora community. 
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4.3 Political Divisions 
Lastly, principles of political division mark the way the Hungarian diaspora is represented in 
Minority Studies. A few authors point to divisions in the diaspora political communities. For 
instance, ant author explains that ‘Vojvodina-Hungarians are deeply divided politically; in 
2012, 5 Hungarian parties contested for the votes of ethnic Hungarians. It is the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians that could register its lists for the presidential, parliamentary, provincial 
and local elections as well, the other four Hungarian parties mostly participated only in the 
local elections’ (Herner-Kovács 2013a, 82). Likewise, in the Ukrainian elections of 1994, 
‘[s]ome conflicts emerged within the KMKSZ in connection with the nomination of candidates. 
The local Hungarians were strongly divided by the campaign’ (Bocskor and Darcsi 2013, 74). 
 This divisions in the Hungarian diaspora, represented as a threat to the interest of the 
Hungarians, thereby allow to call for a unification of the Hungarian political community. As 
an example, authors explain that the ‘division, political fragmentation of the small 
Transcarpathian Hungarian community is the most serious problem of the effective interest-
representation in the country which is home to 46 million people’ (Bocskor and Darcsi 2013, 
79). Moreover, political representation is depicted as the only way to defend the ‘Hungarian 
interests’: ‘the European Parliament (EP) enhances the efficient representation of the interests 
and concerns of ethnic Hungarian communities. Thus regarding the Hungarian government’s 
kin-state policy, the most important concern of the EP elections, held in each member country 
of the European Union between 22-25 May 2014, was the number of ethnic Hungarian 
representatives gaining EP mandates for the next five-year period, and consequently, to what 
extent ethnic Hungarian interests would be represented in the parliamentary body of the EU’ 
(Illyés and Rákóczi 2014, 9. Emphasis mine). Thus, the political divisions in the Hungarian 
national world provides a ground for political unity and solidarity. 
 
4.4 Further Divisions 
Finally, I would like to briefly discuss remaining principles of di/vision of the national world 
that it is possible to identify in Minority Studies. Namely, articles tend to reproduce divisions 
within the diaspora that witness the ambivalence of the processes of unification/division 
currently taking place in the Hungarian diaspora political field. Whilst I have referred to the 
Hungarian diaspora throughout this thesis, the authors in Minority Studies almost 
systematically perform a distinction between the Hungarian diaspora in the Carpathian Basin 
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and the Hungarian diaspora in the West. This division can be analysed as articulated on binary 
oppositions between major/minor, Eastern/Western, minority/diaspora, 
autochthonous/migrant, immobile/mobile, and old/new.  
 The articles are not equally concerned with the two groups, which I will call here for 
the sake of the analysis the ‘Eastern diaspora’ and the ‘Western diaspora’. About 19 articles of 
the Hungaro-centred sample discuss the Eastern diaspora, while only 4 articles are exclusively 
focused on the Western diaspora. Moreover, the articles rarely deal with the Eastern and 
Western diaspora at the same time, marking a difference of nature between the two issues. The 
first group is rarely referred to as ‘Eastern’. Instead, the geographical term of ‘Carpathian 
Basin’ is widely used to represent together the Eastern diaspora – 17 articles out of the 27 
articles of the Hungaro-centred sample mention it. To the contrary, the representation of a 
‘Western’ diaspora is more common: ‘Western Hungarian diaspora’ (Kántor 2014), 
‘Hungarian diaspora in the West’ (Kántor 2014), ‘Hungarians in the West’ (Ludányi 2014). 
 Moreover, authors tend to conceptualise the Eastern diaspora as a ‘minority’: ‘minority 
language’ (Papp Z. 2013), ‘minority schools’ (Ferenc 2016), ‘minority education’ (Papp Z. 
2014), ‘minority politics’ (Bocskor and Darcsi 2013), ‘minority community’ (Kiss 2016), 
‘minority identity’ (Danero Iglesias, Sata, and Vass 2016), ‘minority representation’ (Bocskor 
and Darcsi 2013), ‘minority protection’ (Illyés and Rákóczi 2014), etc. In opposition, the term 
‘diaspora’ is often used – though not systematically, as authors may use it as I –to refer to the 
Western diaspora only (Herner-Kovács 2013b; Herner-Kovács and Kántor 2014; Kántor 2014; 
Herner-Kovács 2014; Ludányi 2014; Gazsó 2016). Lastly, as illustrated above, the Eastern 
diaspora is represented as an autochthonous community that has occupied the Carpathian Basin 
for centuries, created as a result of border movement, and therefore can be considered as an 
old, historical community. On the other end, the Western diaspora is depicted as a migrant 
diaspora, resulting from population movement in more recent years. Thus, the process of 
differentiation between Western and Eastern diaspora is not explicit, and it is well-possible that 
the idea of unity of the Hungarian diaspora is ‘unthinkable’ in the current diaspora political 
field. 
 Finally, a last division between the Hungarian state and the rest of the states can be 
identified in Minority Studies. As a matter of fact, about one third of the articles in Minority 
Studies discuss topics not directly related to the Hungarian diaspora or Hungary. Issue 16 was 
written after an international conference entitled ‘Trends and Directions of Kin-State Policies 
in Europe and Across the Globe’, organised by NPKI in 2012. The conference was arguably of 
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a political nature, as 5 speakers out of 12 were directly involved in politics, such as member of 
the French Senate Joëlle Garriaud-Maylam, or then-Hungarian Ambassador to France László 
Trócsányi. 
According to the organisers, ‘[t]here are many reasons states made it possible for 
citizens to vote while living abroad, but the basic reason is that citizens have a right to have a 
voice in legislation. Kin-minorities and diasporas who have ties to their homeland through 
citizenship should have the ability to vote regardless of where they reside, be it in the 
neighboring states or somewhere further abroad. There is no legitimate reason to prohibit 
citizens from voting because they live in other states, and this has been the European tendency 
over the last several years’ (Herner-Kovács and Kántor 2014, 9). Thus, one of the aims of the 
conference was to ‘illustrate that offering dual citizenship to non-resident ethnic kins is typical 
not exclusively in East Central Europe’ (Herner-Kovács and Kántor 2014, 9). Accordingly, the 
papers explore diaspora politics in Slovenia (Medved 2014), Serbia (Radosavljević 2014), 
Croatia (Koska 2014), Germany (Cordell 2014), France (Garriaud-Maylam 2014), and Austria 
(Mayrhofer-Grünbühel 2014), as well as international and European law (Juhász 2014; Szabó 
2014; Trócsányi 2014). 
This last division allows the comparison of the Hungarian case with other states. 
Representing diaspora politics around Europe allow Hungarian diaspora politics to naturally 
take place amongst them. Often-attacked Hungarian diaspora politics can thereby become 
normalised.  
 
⁂ 
 
This chapter presented an analysis of Minority Studies, a journal edited by NPKI between 2013 
and 2016, in order to explore how visions and divisions of the national world are represented 
and legitimated by actors engaged in the diaspora political field. The representations conveyed 
in Minority Studies reflect the progressive integration of the Hungarian diaspora into the 
Hungarian national world. This redefinition of the Hungarian nation is produced through the 
representation of three key principles of di/vision of the national world: historical, cultural, and 
political. 
First, Minority Studies divides the Hungarian national world according to historical 
principles. This early division, besides being represented as traumatic and arbitrary, also 
presupposes a historical identity between the pre-Trianon Hungarian national community and 
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contemporary social realities. Thus, it legitimates a definition of the Hungarian nation that 
includes the diaspora. Second, the Hungarian diaspora is distinguished from non-Hungarians 
following cultural principles. Articles present the reproduction of this division as positive and 
crucial for the reproduction of the Hungarianness. Third, Minority Studies depicts political 
divisions in the Hungarian national community, thereby allowing the constitution of a political 
representation for the interests of a unified Hungarian community. Finally, whilst the 
boundaries of the national world are moving toward the inclusion of the Hungarian diaspora in 
the Hungarian nation, reoccurring divisions between the representations of a Western and an 
Eastern diaspora raises the question of how to interpret remaining cleavages in the Hungarian 
national world that has started to be delineated between 2010 and 2019. 
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Conclusion 
The establishment of a new Fidesz-KDNP government at the head of the Hungarian state in 
2010 received much attention in the literature. Namely, scholars have frequently analysed the 
politics developed under the leadership of Viktor Orbán as nationalist, that is, producing and 
reproducing national di/visions of the social world (Brubaker 2017; Harris 2012; Pogonyi 
2017b; Toomey 2018). The accession to power of Fidesz-KDNP was accompanied by 
significant changes in the legal and institutional Hungarian landscape, particularly with regard 
to the relation between the Hungarian diaspora and the Hungarian state. 
 Indeed, the new government has been very active in developing what can be 
conceptualised as diaspora politics. Diaspora politics include any form of laws, policy 
documents, institutions, programmes or media that take for object a diaspora living beyond the 
borders of the state. In the Hungarian case, diaspora politics typically target the Hungarian 
communities in the Carpathian Basin, and more recently Western citizens with Hungarian 
heritage. Amongst the numerous developments in the Hungarian diaspora political field, it is 
possible to highlight the ratification of a new constitution including the diaspora in the 
Hungarian nation, the modification of Hungarian electoral law to permit non-resident 
Hungarian citizens to take part in parliamentary elections, but also the establishment of a 
Research Institute on Hungarian Communities Abroad (NPKI) and the reconvening of the 
Hungarian Standing Conference (MÁÉRT), both responsible for the production of new images 
and representations of the Hungarian national community. 
 Diaspora politics, therefore, are distinct yet related to nationalist politics, insofar as they 
produce, reproduce and legitimate the modification or the conservation of principles of visions 
and divisions of the national world. In a word, diaspora politics impact on the production of a 
nation. Accordingly, this thesis aimed to explore the role of Hungarian diaspora politics 
between 2010 and 2019 in the production and reproduction of national di/visions. It argued that 
the development of a new legal and institutional framework for Hungarian diaspora politics 
since 2010 has provided the means to produce, reproduce and legitimate the integration and 
dissolution of the diaspora in a broadly defined Hungarian nation. Furthermore, based on a 
detailed study of the Minority Studies journal, this thesis defended that this diaspora integration 
has taken place through the displacement of the boundaries of the national world. 
 Chapter 1 presented a literature review on diaspora politics. In fact, different studies 
have explored the development of diaspora politics in Hungary. Myra A. Waterbury (2006a and 
2006b) and Szabolcs Pogonyi (2015) convincingly argued that Hungarian diaspora politics are 
68 
 
triggered by party competition and should therefore be analysed in a domestic politics 
framework – as opposed to foreign policy or cultural studies. Moreover, other research sheds 
light on the significance of diaspora politics at several levels: regional (Sobják 2012), 
international (Butler 2008), European (Waterbury 2016), domestic politics (Pogonyi, Kovács, 
and Körtvélyesi 2010), and minority politics (Pogonyi 2017a; 2017b; Székely 2014; Waterbury 
2017). Crucially, Pogonyi (2019) and Pap (2013) also explored the impact of diaspora politics 
at the level of individuals’ practices of the nation. Based on this literature review, it is possible 
to observe that scholarly attention has primarily been paid to the causes and consequences of 
Hungarian diaspora politics. 
However, if one posits the relation between diaspora politics and nation-production, the 
processes and mechanisms behind this relation are yet to be analysed. Thus, Chapter 1 also 
presented the conceptual tools – drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s political theory - that provided 
the backbone of this thesis. First, the concept of diaspora political field – a sub-field of the 
political field wherein actors involved in diaspora politics compete – was deemed useful to take 
into consideration the transstate nature of diaspora politics. Second, diaspora politics were 
defined as the whole of the political struggles for the imposition of the principles of di/vision 
of the national world. Third, the struggle happening within diaspora politics was conceptualised 
as a struggle for and of political representations.  
Back to the theoretical framework developed above, this research developed in two 
steps. In order to understand how Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 have 
contributed to the production and reproduction of Hungarian national di/visions, it was first 
crucial to outline the scope and forms that diaspora politics took in Hungary between 2010 and 
2019. Thus, Chapter 3 aimed to analyse the development of the Hungarian diaspora political 
field between 2010 and 2019. Precisely, it asked how the development of a legal and 
institutional framework to Hungarian diaspora politics between 2010 and 2019 has enabled the 
production and reproduction of new national representations. The argument was elaborated 
based on a chronological analysis of Hungarian diaspora politics before and after 2010, as well 
as on a content analysis of representations of the Hungarian diaspora in documents and imaged 
produced by diaspora political institutions. I argued that whilst a Hungarian diaspora political 
field started to emerge from the early nineties, the establishment of a new party in 2010 
triggered a reorganisation of the field. Namely, the development of a new legal and institutional 
framework for diaspora politics ensured the production, reproduction and legitimation of 
representations of a diaspora included in the realm of the Hungarian national world. 
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In order to study the displacement of the borders of the national world from closer, 
Chapter 4 provided an analysis of a social-scientific journal, Minority Studies, edited by NPKI, 
a key institution in the diaspora political landscape since 2011. Specifically, the chapter 
inquired how visions and divisions of the national world are represented and legitimated by 
actors engaged in the diaspora political field. The analysis was grounded on a content analysis 
on 43 articles published in Minority Studies by several authors between 2013 and 2016. I 
showed that the integration of the diaspora in the Hungarian national community is produced 
through the the representation of three key principles of di/vision of the national world: 
historical, cultural, and political.  
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2014_16_11 2014 16 Viktor Koska ‘The Development of Kin-state Policies and 
the Croatian Citizenship Regime’ 
2014_16_12 2014 16 Sulyok Márton ‘Priorities for Kin-State Policies within 
Constitutions’ 
2014_17_01 2014 17 Gergely Illyés and 
Krisztián Rákóczi 
‘European Parliamentary Elections in the 
Carpathian Basin in 2014’ 
2014_17_02 2014 17 Zoltán Kántor ‘Hungary’s Kin-State Politics, 2010-2014’ 
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2014_17_03 2014 17 Attila Dabis ‘The South Tyrolean Party System’ 
2014_17_04 2014 17 Eszter Herner-Kovács ‘Nation Building Extended: Hungarian 
Diaspora Politics’ 
2014_17_05 2014 17 András Ludányi ‘The Origins of Diaspora Consciousness in 
the Hungarian American Experience’ 
2014_17_06 2014 17 Attila Papp Z. ‘Selecting a Majority-Language School by 
Hungarian Minority Students, or From PISA 
Results to Discourses in the Carpathian 
Basin’ 
2014_17_07 2014 17 Attila Papp Z. and 
Zsombor Csata 
‘Hungarian PhD Students Abroad: 
International Contexts and Specificities of 
the Carpathian Basin’ 
2014_17_08 2014 17 Péter Varga ‘“Racial or Ethnic Origin” vs. “Membership 
of a National Minority” in EU Law’ 
2014_17_09 2014 17 Myroslav S. 
Dnistrianskyy and 
Oksana I Skliarska 
‘Territorial – Political Differentiation of 
Ukraine: Forming Factors, Contradictions of 
Ethno-Cultural Relations, Prospects of 
Social Consolidation’ 
2016_18_01 2016 18 György Schöpflin ‘Hungary and the Transfrontier 
Communities’ 
2016_18_02 2016 18 Julien Danero Iglesias, 
Róbert Sata, and 
Ágnes Vass 
‘Citizenship and Identity: Being Hungarian 
in Slovakia and Romanian in Serbia and 
Ukraine’ 
2016_18_03 
 
2016 18 Tamás Kiss ‘Increasing Marginality, Ethnic Parallelism 
and Asymmetric Accommodation. Social 
and Political Processes Concerning the 
Hungarian Community of Transylvania’ 
2016_18_04 2016 18 Valeria Ilareva ‘Migration, Asylum and Citizenship Policies 
in Bulgaria’ 
2016_18_05 2016 18 Eszter Herner-Kovács, 
Gergely Illyés, and 
Krisztián Rákóczi 
‘External Votes at the 2014 Hungarian 
National Election’ 
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2016_18_06 2016 18 István Csernicskó and 
Csilla Fedinec 
‘Language and Language Policy in 
Transcarpathia between the Two World 
Wars’ 
2016_18_07 2016 18 Viktória Ferenc ‘Invisible for International Assessments: 
Student Competencies in Subcarpathia’ 
2016_18_08 2016 18 András Morauszki and 
Attila Papp Z. 
‘Ethnic revival? The Methodology of the 
2011 Census and the Nationalities of 
Hungary’ 
2016_18_09 2016 18 Dániel Gazsó ‘An Endnote Definition for Diaspora 
Studies’ 
2016_18_10 2016 18 Gabe Harrach ‘Does Ethnic Proximity Foster Radical 
Nationalism?’ 
Table 2. Summary of the dataset collected for the analysis of Chapter 4. 
Source: Original table 
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Author Affiliation Type Country Article(s) in 
Minority 
Studies 
Ágnes 
Mándityné 
Zsifkovics 
Miroslav Krleža Horvát 
Óvoda, Általános 
Iskola, Gimnázium és 
Kollégium 
Other Hungary 2013_15_11 
Ágnes Vass University of Alberta Academia Canada 2016_18_02 
András 
Ludányi 
Ohio Northern 
University/NPKI 
Academia/Para-
politics 
United 
States/Hungary 
2014_17_05 
András 
Morauszki 
Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Institute for 
Minority Studies 
Academia Hungary 2016_18_08 
Andrea 
Bocskor 
Fidesz MEP in the 
European Parliament 
Politics Hungary 2013_15_04 
Attila Dabis Corvinus University Academia Hungary 2014_17_03 
Attila Papp Z. Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Institute for 
Minority Studies 
Academia Hungary 2013_15_06;  
2014_17_06; 
2014_17_07; 
2016_18_08 
Attila Varga Romániai Magyar 
Demokrata Szövetség 
Politics Romania 2013_15_09 
Balázs Vizi Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences 
Academia Hungary 2013_15_01 
Csilla Fedinec Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Institute for 
Minority Studies 
Academia Hungary 2016_18_06 
Dániel Gazsó NPKI Para-politics Hungary 2016_18_09 
Duško 
Radosavljević 
Faculty of Law and 
Business 
Academia Serbia 2014_16_10 
Eszter Herner-
Kovács 
Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University/NPKI/ 
Academia/Para-
politics/Academia 
Hungary 2013_15_05;  
2013_15_10;  
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Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences, Institute for 
Minority Studies 
2014_16_01; 
2014_17_04; 
2016_18_05 
Felicita Medved European Liberal 
Forum/Institute Novum 
Para-
politics/Para-
politics 
Belgium/Slovenia 2014_16_09 
Ferdinand 
Mayrhofer-
Grünbühel 
Formerly Austrian 
Embassy to Hungary 
Politics Austria 2014_16_07 
Gabe Harrach NPKI Para-politics Hungary 2016_18_10 
Gergely Illyés NPKI Para-politics Hungary 2014_17_01;  
2016_18_05 
Gergô Barna Babeş-Bolyai 
University 
Academia Romania 2013_15_02 
György 
Schöpflin 
Fidesz MEP in the 
European Parliament 
Politics Hungary 2016_18_01 
Hajnalka 
Juhász 
Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University 
Academia Hungary 2014_16_04 
Irina Culic Babeş-Bolyai 
University 
Academia Romania 2014_16_08 
István 
Csernicskó 
Ferenc Rákóczi II 
Transcarpathian 
Hungarian 
Institute/University of 
Pannonia 
Other/Academia Ukraine/Hungary 2016_18_06 
István Gergely 
Szûts 
National Archives of 
Hungary 
Other Hungary 2013_15_12 
Joëlle 
Garriaud-
Maylam 
Les Republicains 
senator in the French 
Senate 
Politics France 2014_16_06 
Julien Danero 
Iglesias 
University of Glasgow Academia United Kingdom 2016_18_02 
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Karl Cordell Plymouth University Academia United Kingdom 2014_16_05 
Karolina Darcsi Berehove Town 
Council 
Politics Ukraine 2013_15_04 
Krisztián 
Rákóczi 
Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University/NPKI 
Academia/Para-
politics 
Hungary 2014_17_01;  
2016_18_05 
László 
Gyurgyík 
Forum Minority 
Research Institute 
Para-politics Slovakia 2013_15_03 
László Szarka János Selye University Academia Slovakia 2013_15_07 
László 
Trócsányi 
Hungarian Ambassy to 
France/Venice 
Commission of the 
Council of Europe 
Politics/Politics Hungary 2014_16_02 
Marcel Szabó Pázmány Péter Catholic 
University 
Academia Hungary 2014_16_03 
Myroslav S. 
Dnistrianskyy 
Lviv Ivan Franko 
National University 
Academia Ukraine 2014_17_09 
Oksana I 
Skliarska 
Lviv Ivan Franko 
National University 
Academia Ukraine 2014_17_09 
Péter Varga Eötvös Loránd 
University 
Academia Hungary 2014_17_08 
Róbert Sata Central European 
University, Political 
Science Department 
Academia Hungary 2016_18_02 
Sulyok Márton University of Szeged Academia Hungary 2014_16_12 
Tamás Kiss Romanian Institute for 
Research on National 
Minorities 
Para-politics Romania 2013_15_02;  
2016_18_03 
Tünde Morvai Eötvös Loránd 
University 
Academia Hungary 2013_15_07 
Valeria Ilareva Foundation for Access 
to Rights 
Para-politics Bulgaria 2016_18_04 
Viktor Koska University of Zagreb Academia Croatia 2014_16_11 
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Viktória Ferenc NPKI Para-politics Hungary 2013_15_08;  
2016_18_07 
Zoltán Kántor NPKI Para-politics Hungary 2014_16_01;  
2014_17_02 
Zsombor Csata Babeş-Bolyai 
University 
Academia Romania 2014_17_07 
Table 3. Institutional affiliations of the authors in Minority Studies between 2013 and 2014 
Source: Original table 
 
Theme 
Hungar
o-
centred 
WW1 
Eastern 
Diaspora 
Western 
Diaspor
a 
Division
s within 
the 
Diaspor
a 
Romania
ns 
Slovakia
ns 
Ukrainia
ns 
Serbs 
Croatia
ns 
Slovene
s 
Roma
s 
Threats 
Key 
words 
Hungary
, 
Hungari
an 
Trianon, 
Versaille
s, Paris, 
empire, 
Austro-
Hungari
an 
Carpathia
n Basin 
diaspora
, United 
States, 
Canada 
division, 
divided 
Romania, 
Romanian 
Slovakia, 
Slovakia
n, Slovak 
Ukraine, 
Ukrainian 
Serbia, 
Serbia
n, Serb 
Croatia, 
Croatian
, Croat 
Slovenia
, 
Slovenia
n, 
Slovene 
Roma, 
Roma
ni 
Assimilatio
n, 
assimilate, 
assimilator
y 
2013_15_
02 
1  1   1 1 1 1   1 1 
2013_15_
03 
1  1    1     1 1 
2013_15_
04 
1  1  1   1     1 
2013_15_
05 
1  1  1  1   1    
2013_15_
06 
1  1   1      1 1 
2013_15_
07 
1  1  1  1     1 1 
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2013_15_
08 
1  1  1   1    1 1 
2013_15_
10 
1   1 1 1        
2013_15_
12 
1 1 1   1       1 
2014_16_
01 
1  1           
2014_16_
12 
1          1   
2014_17_
01 
1 1    1 1       
2014_17_
02 
1             
2014_17_
04 
1 1  1          
2014_17_
05 
1 1  1 1 1 1      1 
2014_17_
06 
1    1 1 1 1    1 1 
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2014_17_
07 
1     1 1 1 1     
2016_18_
01 
1 1 1          1 
2016_18_
02 
1 1 1   1 1 1 1   1 1 
2016_18_
03 
1  1  1 1      1 1 
2016_18_
05 
1  1   1 1 1      
2016_18_
06 
1 1 1   1 1 1  1    
2016_18_
07 
1  1     1    1 1 
2016_18_
08 
1     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2016_18_
09 
1 1 1 1 1 1      1 1 
2016_18_
10 
1 1 1   1 1     1  
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Table 4. Theme occurrence in the articles of Minority Studies 
Source: Original table 
Sub-total 
Hungaro-
centred 
26 9 17 4 9 15 13 10 4 3 2 12 15 
Hungaro-
centred 
% 
100 34.6 65.3 15.4 35 58 50 38 15.4 12 7.6 46.2 57.7 
Total % 60.5 20.9 39.5 9.3 21 35 30 23 9.3 7 4.6 27.9 34.9 
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